Smart Contract Audit | Security Monitoring | AML/CFT (KYA/KYT) | Crypto Investigation | @Phalcon_xyz @MetaSleuth @MetaDockTeam 👉TG: t.me/BlockSecTeam
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If your crypto gets stolen today, you usually have two options: pay a professional firm thousands of dollars, assuming they'll even take a small case, or just give up.
We built Trace AI to give you a third.
It runs on the same tracing tech behind @MetaSleuth, which our team has used on on-chain cases worth over a billion dollars. 8 chains, 10 languages, and it starts at $5.
piped.video/watch?v=SdcAEE2c…
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BlockSec retweeted
.@_Qubic_ was reportedly exploited due to weak wallet seed generation. The issue now appears to have been fixed: github.com/qubic/wallet/comm…
However, the vulnerability was reported as early as February and does not appear to have been properly addressed at the time. The current fix also appears to follow the recommendation in that report: replacing Math.random() with crypto.getRandomValues().
Reports affecting critical components such as wallet seed generation deserve timely attention and follow-up.
Security incident update.
Between 23:42 UTC on 17 October and 01:26 UTC on 18 October, an attacker drained 1,404 Qubic wallets, totalling around 2.94 trillion QU.
Here is what happened, what has been done, and what comes next.
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BlockSec retweeted
.@UNCX_token was exploited across multiple chains for ~$1.5M. The root cause was inconsistent accounting of _totalTokenShares between release() and cancel(). This variable tracks the total outstanding shares of all schedules for a token.
Specifically, after release(), a schedule with _depositedShares = D and schedule.released = R has only D − R shares remaining in _totalTokenShares. However, cancel() removes D − V, where V is the recalculated vestedShare.
This accounting assumption can be broken through a donation followed by a top-up, which increases schedule.totalAmount while minting very few new shares and pushes V below R. Consequently, D − V exceeds the schedule’s remaining D − R shares, causing cancel() to deduct shares already removed by release(). This reduces the shared _totalTokenShares denominator and inflates the payout from the schedule retained by the attacker.
The key attack steps are illustrated using this exploit transaction:
app.blocksec.com/phalcon/exp…
1. Set up three schedules: The attacker created schedules 5058, 5059, and 5060. They fully released 5059 and 5060 while retaining 5058 for the final withdrawal.
2. Donate: The attacker transferred tokens directly to the vesting contract, inflating the asset-per-share value without minting new shares.
3. Top up and cancel: The attacker topped up schedules 5059 and 5060 with future-vesting tokens. Due to the manipulated share price, the top-ups greatly increased schedule.totalAmount while minting very few new shares, pushing vestedShare below schedule.released. Cancelling the schedules then deducted previously released shares from _totalTokenShares again.
4. Extract profits: With _totalTokenShares artificially reduced, the attacker released schedule 5058 at an inflated redemption value and repaid the flash loan.
The attacker repeated this process to drain assets from the vulnerable contract.
UNCX Vesting V2: Security Incident Update
Following the security incident affecting our Vesting V2 contracts across several chains earlier today, we want to share an update on the measures taken, the affected tokens, and what comes next.
1. Security measures and containment
We have implemented several measures to prevent further exploitation of the affected contracts:
> Introduced substantial flat fees exceeding 1,000 ETH per lock.
> Removed all clients and contract interactions that previously allowed these fees to be bypassed.
> Increased token fees to the maximum permitted by the Vesting V2 contracts (5%), making repeated vesting top-ups economically unviable.
These measures are designed to prevent further exploitation through the identified methods. While our investigation and monitoring remain ongoing, we firmly believe we have taken the necessary steps available to us to contain the incident.
2. Scope of the incident
As previously communicated, all LP lockers remain unaffected, across every protocol and chain supported by UNCX.
The incident is isolated to UNCX Vesting V2. Our legacy vesting contracts are also unaffected and have undergone additional checks and review.
The incident currently involves 10 tokens across 4 chains:
Ethereum (6): $pepecoin, $EDGEN, $ZC, $X, $LO0P, $PAAL
Base (1): $IMO
BNB Chain (1): $BTCLE
Robinhood Chain (2): $CASHCAT, $RKST
3. Next steps for affected projects and communities
We are already in contact with most of the affected teams, communities or individuals impacted.
We expect to share further guidance and next steps with affected teams this week.
We will also publish a comprehensive incident report covering the technical findings, financials, and the details of our proposed recovery plan.
Important: For all impacted tokens, we strongly advise against trading in the affected pools until further guidance is provided by the respective token teams. We will be coordinating directly with those teams over the coming days.
4. Investigation and recovery efforts
Our investigation remains active, and we are coordinating with law enforcement and @seal911.
To date, no funds have been returned by the attackers (primary and copycats) on any affected chain. We strongly encourage the responsible party to contact us directly to discuss a resolution.
We understand the seriousness of this incident for affected projects, holders, and communities.
Our immediate priorities remain preventing further exploitation, establishing the full extent of the impact, and working closely with affected teams toward a recovery plan.
We will continue to communicate when any meaningful updates become available.
Thank you for your patience.
The UNCX Team
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BlockSec retweeted
🗓 Weekly Web3 Security Roundup | Oct 05 - Oct 11
🚨 Spotlight on 1 notable incident | ~$542K lost this week
Featuring a vulnerability breakdown and in-depth analysis of selected key cases👇
blocksec.com/blog/web3-secur…
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BlockSec retweeted
About 6 hours ago, ~$3.55M in unclaimed bridge funds was claimed and transferred out. Did the owner initiate the transactions, or did an attacker obtain valid EIP-7702 authorizations?
Several days earlier, stuckfunds.eth, an onchain researcher, had sent multiple messages to 0x4943, notifying the owner that the funds were still claimable. The claims were submitted by 0x24a9, an address funded via Tornado Cash, and executed through EIP-7702 delegations on the EOA.
Onchain data confirms that the authorizations were valid, but not whether the owner signed them intentionally, was tricked into signing them, or had the private key compromised.
TX1 ($1.33M): app.blocksec.com/phalcon/exp…
TX2 ($2.22M): app.blocksec.com/phalcon/exp…
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BlockSec retweeted
🗓 BiWeekly Web3 Security Roundup | Sep 21 - Oct 04
🚨 Spotlight on 8 notable incidents | ~$418M lost these two weeks
Featuring a vulnerability breakdown and in-depth analysis of selected key cases👇
blocksec.com/blog/web3-secur…
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BlockSec retweeted
NEAR Intents @near_intents suffered a ~$3.8M exploit due to a vulnerability affecting its deposit and withdrawal infrastructure. The attacker drained assets from a BNB Chain hot wallet, with the stolen funds subsequently routed through KuCoin and bridged to Bitcoin. NEAR Intents has patched the affected components and temporarily suspended deposits and withdrawals across 11 networks for security checks. The team has also announced a compensation plan to fully reimburse affected users.
Earlier today NEAR Intents services were stopped after a security incident was detected. The incident was caused by a bug in the Omni deposit and withdrawal infrastructure interaction with NEAR Intents smart contract.
The preliminary report indicates the total loss of approximately $3.8M. These funds will be compensated in full.
The contract-side vulnerability has been patched. The operations of the NEAR Intents and near(.)com are expected to resume within 1h.
Deposits and withdrawals on the following networks will remain unavailable for an additional ~12 hours while fixes to the Omni infrastructure are completed: BSC, Polygon, TON, Optimism, Avalanche, Stellar, Monad, LayerX, Adi, Scroll and Plasma.
In case users hold any assets from these chains inside NEAR Intents (for example, in HOT wallet or on near(.)com), they will be able to swap them into other assets once NEAR Intents is back up (in ~1h).
The incident has been reported to law enforcement, and we are working with security and blockchain analytics partners to trace the funds and pursue recovery. A detailed report will be shared publicly in the following days.
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Bitget: $387.5M stolen. Less than $1M frozen.
Full fund flow analysis: blocksec.com/blog/bitget-hac…
$183M swapped into ETH within hours. Issuers froze $339K. NEAR Intents blocked $50M in attempts but caught $503K. THORChain let it all through.
Tracing worked. Freezing did not, because the window was hours and most of it closed before the first request landed.
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Bitget: $387.5M gone. No private key stolen, no contract exploited.
The attacker compromised internal credentials and told the wallet system to send the money. It did.
Bybit, now Bitget. The attack surface has moved off-chain.
Our breakdown, with a complete security review framework for exchanges and custodians: blocksec.com/blog/bitget-387…
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BlockSec retweeted
.@payy_link was reportedly exploited, with estimated losses of $1.93M. Interestingly, the verifyRollup traces show several burn operations executed successfully with all-zero burn_hash values. How these zero hashes passed verification remains unclear; possible causes include a circuit flaw or a compromise of privileged infrastructure. The team has not yet responded publicly.
Attack TX1: app.blocksec.com/phalcon/exp…
Attack TX2:
app.blocksec.com/phalcon/exp…
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BlockSec retweeted
🗓 Weekly Web3 Security Roundup | Sep 14 - Sep 20
🚨 Spotlight on 2 notable incidents | ~$11.3M lost this week
Featuring a vulnerability breakdown and in-depth analysis of selected key cases👇
blocksec.com/blog/web3-secur…
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BlockSec retweeted
🚨 ALERT! We have observed a series of attack transactions targeting contracts on #Ethereum, including those associated with @Fetch_ai, @nunet_global, and @SingularityNET. Total losses exceed $2.1 million.
The incidents appear to stem from leaked private keys belonging to two privileged accounts (e.g., the deployer account). By controlling these accounts, the attacker was able to execute authorized privileged operations and drain valuable assets through direct transfers or token minting.
The attacker appears to be actively probing potential victims, with @SingularityNET’s AGIX token being the latest target. Stay vigilant！
Compromised accounts:
etherscan.io/address/0x1572F…
etherscan.io/address/0x863F1…
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Attackers rarely break the chain. They take over a channel you already trust — a real account, a real conversation, a real history.
BlockSec co-founder @yajinzhou and the Gate security team on how account takeovers, phishing and impersonation actually work, and what separation of identity, devices and permissions buys you.
🚨 安全小测试：合作伙伴突然发来新收款地址，还附上盖章确认函——你转不转？
⚠️ 先别急，听听专家怎么说！？
首期 #大门安全课，Gate 安全团队携手 @BlockSecTeam，带你拆穿那些“专攻人性、不攻代码”的套路 👇
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BlockSec retweeted
.@nostrafinance was reportedly hit by a price-manipulation attack: approximately $3.5M was borrowed against NSTR collateral, though the final loss is not yet confirmed.
1. The attacker first created an NSTR/SolvBTC pool and added 1.5 SolvBTC as one-sided liquidity away from the active price: voyager.online/tx/0x741af6ef….
This increased the pool liquidity reported by GeckoTerminal, apparently influencing which pool supplied its Pragma NSTR price.
2. The attacker then added very little liquidity between the normal price and a much higher price; a small buy pushed the quote sharply upward: starkscan.co/tx/0x772e73613f….
At that point, Pragma had two contributing NSTR/USD prices: a normal AVNU quote of ~$0.00596118 (starkscan.co/tx/0x1d33ab3d3f…) and a manipulated GeckoTerminal quote of ~$99.02439975 (starkscan.co/tx/0x6bc9b41bce…).
Although the documentation describes a median of three sources, the second listed source did not provide a price in this instance. With only two available values, the median was their arithmetic average, approximately $49.51518, consistent with the borrow trace.
3. The attacker used another account holding NSTR collateral to borrow ETH, STRK, USDC, USDT, WBTC and DAIv1 at the inflated valuation: starkscan.co/v1/SN_MAIN/tx/0…
On September 17, a manipulated NSTR oracle price enabled one account to borrow approximately $3.5 million worth of ETH, STRK, USDC, USDT, WBTC and DAIv1 against NSTR collateral in the Nostra money market on Starknet.
The Nostra money market is paused: lending, borrowing, withdrawals and liquidations are currently unavailable. We are reconciling the impact on each asset and tracing the funds. The final loss and potential recoveries are not yet known.
We are working with relevant parties on recovery and will share verified updates, including a detailed post-mortem.
Beware of impersonators. Nostra will never DM you or ask you to connect a wallet as part of recovery.
Ongoing updates will be posted in our Discord.
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BlockSec retweeted
🗓 Weekly Web3 Security Roundup | Sep 07 - Sep 13
🚨 Spotlight on 2 notable incidents | ~$320M lost this week
Featuring a vulnerability breakdown and in-depth analysis of selected key cases👇
blocksec.com/blog/web3-secur…
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BlockSec retweeted
ALERT! Our system detected an attack that drained ~$7.8M from a Gnosis Safe wallet on Ethereum (0x40E93a52F6Af9fCD3b476aeDADD7FeABD9f7AbA8).
The root cause was a flawed authorization check in the executor contract (0x4f0055926c839D1d960a82CBF84E2eE933958ebC). Setting the supplied contract parameter to address(this) passed validation, allowing attacker-controlled calls to execute from the trusted executor through an enabled Safe module.
The exploit moved ~2,900 aEthrsETH into a Uniswap V4 pool paired with the worthless “Permissionless Attacker Token” (PAT), leaving the Safe with a worthless LP NFT.
The original attack transaction was front-run by the MEV bot yoink, which captured ~2,882 rsETH (~$7.8M) and routed it to 0xC70f00CD7E461686b04B0E912E309becA8b80ea0.
Original attack TX: app.blocksec.com/phalcon/exp…
Front-run TX: app.blocksec.com/phalcon/exp…
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BlockSec retweeted
🗓 Weekly Web3 Security Roundup | Aug 31 - Sep 06
🚨 Spotlight on 4 notable incidents | ~$9.4M lost this week
Featuring a vulnerability breakdown and in-depth analysis of selected key cases👇
blocksec.com/blog/web3-secur…
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BlockSec's blockchain penetration testing is now live, written up as a series: What it covers, where its boundaries sit, how it is authorized, and which attack surfaces it has to reach.
First four parts are live, more to come 🔜
Part 1: Why institutions need it: blocksec.com/blog/why-crypto…
Part 2: What it is, and its boundaries: blocksec.com/blog/what-is-bl…
Part 3: Authorization and production safety: blocksec.com/blog/blockchain…
Part 4: The attack surfaces it covers: blocksec.com/blog/web3-attac…
A cloud and web pentest stops where the money starts moving.
Signing → approval → fund logic → on-chain transactions — we test that chain adversarially, in an agreed scope, with evidence for every confirmed path.
Blockchain Penetration Testing, now live at BlockSec!
Start here👇
blocksec.com/blockchain-pene…
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BlockSec retweeted
A cloud and web pentest stops where the money starts moving.
Signing → approval → fund logic → on-chain transactions — we test that chain adversarially, in an agreed scope, with evidence for every confirmed path.
Blockchain Penetration Testing, now live at BlockSec!
Start here👇
blocksec.com/blockchain-pene…
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Builders on @BNBCHAIN can now book BlockSec's security services through the AvengerDAO marketplace.
🔍 Audits — coverage spans the full stack: smart contracts, DeFi protocols, L1s, L2s and rollups, wallets, bridges, nodes and RPC infrastructure. Every audit evaluates implementation security, business logic and, where applicable, economic design, backed by our own static analyzer and LLM-assisted detection system. Alongside audits, we run dedicated blockchain penetration testing and security testing.
📡 Real-time monitoring — Phalcon keeps watching your protocol once it's live, so risk doesn't sit unnoticed between audits.
Our findings go beyond severity ratings. Each issue comes with clear, actionable remediation, and every report is built for real-world use: mainnet launches, public disclosures, exchange listing reviews and compliance processes.
Find us on the AvengerDAO marketplace 👇
avengerdao.org/marketplace
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