Caper, week to 28 October, on Stokenet, Radix's test network.
New caper: $ASCENT, for the Radix arcade game ASCENT, launched on 25 October from a wallet outside the team, the first since the network reset.
Voting: the ballot now shows to any wallet holding the caper's token, including one that received it by transfer, which is the contract's own rule for who may vote.
Exit: Max now exits the whole balance, and the exit dialog says when it cannot read a position instead of checking forever.
Hardening: the app believes only events a Caper contract emitted; a proposal action keeps only the fields its kind uses on-chain; a proposal's status never steps backwards after a lost race; and signing out ends the session on the server.
Wiki: holders can move and delete a caper's pages, in the editor and through the MCP server. Pages gain an events block that sorts itself into upcoming and past, a locations block that says whether a place is open now, and testimonials. The editor has a new toolbar and add menu.
caper.network/capers/ASCENT?…
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In a plain token vote, the balance that counts is the one a holder had when they voted, or at a snapshot taken before voting opened. Nothing ties it to what they hold when the result takes effect. A holder can vote with a large position, sell it the same day, and leave the outcome to the people who still own the token and will live with it.
Some DAOs answer with locks. Curve's vote-escrow gives voting power only to tokens locked for a fixed term, and locked tokens cannot be sold or used elsewhere until the term ends.
A caper counts each ballot at the smaller of what its voter held when voting and what they hold when the ballots are counted. Selling after voting shrinks your own ballot, so nobody can vote with a position they no longer hold, and no token has to be locked to get there.
caper.network/wiki/governanc…
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In most DAOs a vote counts by the tokens behind it, so the largest wallets decide, and anyone who wants a particular result can buy the weight for it the week before the vote.
A caper counts a ballot by two things: the position its voter holds, and a record of the ballots they have cast. The record comes only from voting. Buying, selling and receiving tokens add nothing to it, and no member can pass theirs to anyone else.
So a large holder who arrives for one proposal meets members who have voted on every proposal before it, and a big bag alone can't capture control. Stake still counts: between two members with the same record, the larger holder weighs more.
How a caper's vote is counted: caper.network/wiki/governanc…
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Losing a DAO vote usually ends the matter. The winning proposal goes through, and a member who voted against it can accept it or sell their tokens on the open market, leaving their share of the treasury behind.
A caper gives the losing side two moves.
If the winning option is an action, such as a payment from the treasury, it does not run when the ballot closes. Holders get a window first, and selling during that window counts as an objection. If enough holders sell, the action is blocked and can never run.
Any member who has voted at least once can also leave at any time and take their fair share of the treasury with them. Leaving is one transaction from their own wallet, not a proposal, so nobody votes on it and no founder or council can block it.
How leaving works: caper.network/wiki/foundatio…
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In many DAOs a vote is advice. Members vote on a forum or on Snapshot, and then the few people holding the treasury's keys decide whether, and when, to carry it out. A vote that asks for money and a vote that only takes the room's temperature look the same on the ballot, and both wait on someone acting afterwards.
A caper settles the difference when a proposal is created. Each option is either an action the treasury will perform, such as a payment with its recipient and amount written in, or a debate position that answers a question and does nothing else. A winning debate position ends at the count.
A winning action is armed rather than carried out: holders get a window in which selling counts as an objection. If it survives the window, anyone can carry it out on-chain, so acting on the result needs no one's permission.
Why a decision should carry itself out: caper.network/blog/the-bindi…
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Most DAO treasuries sit behind a multisig: a handful of signers hold the keys, and a vote can tell them what to pay but cannot make the payment itself. What the treasury does depends on those signers.
A caper's treasury has no signers. There is no founder key, no admin withdrawal and no operations wallet outside governance. Money leaves in two ways only: an action that won a ballot and then survived a window in which holders can object by selling, or a member taking their share when they leave.
A payment's recipient, token and amount are written into the proposal when it is created, so what members vote on is what moves. Once it survives the window, anyone can carry it out on-chain, and the payment sits on the ledger with its recipient named.
How a payment from a caper is proposed and decided: caper.network/wiki/foundatio…
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Caper, week to 21 October, on Stokenet, Radix's test network.
Governance: the app no longer signs anything. Counting a proposal's votes is now a button on the proposal page, sent from a member's own wallet, and the transaction that finishes the count records the result. A server key used to run the count.
Agents: Caper's MCP server now builds these actions with the app's own code: swap, exit, withdraw or hand on the founder role, activate an upgrade, and count, resolve and execute proposals. An agent's trade refuses to fill below the same floor the swap form sets, and agents can read and write a caper's About section.
App: one home per action, with one Trade entry, one list of capers and one search box. Search has a results page you can share. Posting limits on the Trollbox and on uploads no longer reset when someone brings a fresh wallet.
Essay: The Withdrawable Share, on the two ways out of an organization. Company law stopped a company handing its members their capital back; co-operative law built the hand-back in and let the board suspend it. A caper offers both ways out.
caper.network/blog/the-withd…
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When Uniswap launched UNI in September 2020, 21.27% of the supply went to team members and future employees and 18.04% to investors, vesting over four years. That is the usual way a DAO pays its founders: a slice of the supply set aside before anyone else can buy, released on a schedule fixed at launch. The schedule pays out the same whether the protocol thrives or stalls.
A caper's founder starts with no tokens. Nothing is set aside for them or anyone else before the first buy. They are paid a share of every trade as it happens, buys and sells alike, and the larger part of it in XRD. A caper nobody trades pays its founder nothing, so the founder's income depends on the caper still being worth trading long after launch.
caper.network/wiki/foundatio…
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Caper, week to 11 October.
Governance. A proposal now carries one fee, which its proposer pays on creating it and which scales with the radix:native value of its largest option, above a minimum. Triggering a passed proposal is free. Both changes went live on Stokenet, the Radix test network, in the 6 October redeploy. The site settles a closed vote itself, so the TALLY VOTES button is gone, and anyone can press EXECUTE on a passed proposal, as the contract already allowed. The site copies each tally, trigger and resolve verdict off the on-chain record, so it cannot miss one. A caper's page shows your exit share in XRD, and a settled debate counts as concluded rather than live.
In the contracts, not yet deployed: a trade will name the caper it buys or sells directly, and each caper will publish the state of its own curve, which cuts the network fee on a buy, a sell or a swap.
Site. The price chart is the one radix.wiki uses: it opens on candles with a volume pane, switches to an area line, runs from 24 hours to all time by day, week or month, and sits in a panel beside the Trollbox, the caper's chat room. A caper's About moves to a tab beside Market. An idle caper position appears once, in Holdings. Every element shows a focus ring for keyboard users, and a missing page returns a real 404. Caper's one-line description is now "perpetual fundraising for organizations on Radix".
Analytics. Caper counts its own visitors and Plausible is gone: no cookie, no stored address, and each visitor is hashed under a salt deleted daily. The private stats page charts every figure by day with its change, narrows to any page or source it lists, and reaches back a year through the Plausible history.
Wiki. The editor edits every block it shows, keeps Save in view, saves on Cmd-S, warns before you leave unsaved changes, and opens the link field on the current link. Clicking through a text block no longer marks it edited. Gitcoin DAO's page records the Governor upgrade it executed on 5 October, and Arbitrum DAO's records the wind-down of Arbitrum Gaming Ventures.
Under the hood. wiki-formant, the shared package behind caper.network and radix.wiki, is updated through the week. Colour literals become design tokens, the security policy's list of embeddable sites comes from the sanitiser's list, and the wiki and essays are cached for a day and refreshed on edit. Production builds skip Turbopack's build cache, which had shipped stale styles. The video studio films the governance flow: ballot, trigger, resolve and exit.
caper.network/wiki/governanc…
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Aave's token holders voted 572,726 to 0 on 10 October to form the Aave Foundation, a Cayman company with no members that will hold the Aave trademark, domains and code. Aave Labs, which builds the protocol, gets no seat on it. The Aave DAO page now covers the terms.
caper.network/wiki/daos/lend…
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The Proposals page now covers the 11 October redeploy, which changed how a trade names its caper and left voting, the market window and the proposal fee as they were. caper.network/wiki/governanc…
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Gitcoin's token holders have replaced the contract that runs their on-chain votes. The new Governor, executed on 5 October with 2.71m GTC for and none against, adds a guardian that can cancel a malicious proposal but never change or force one, and a quorum the DAO can adjust by vote. Gitcoin moved after Tally, the front end it voted through, announced its shutdown in March. caper.network/wiki/daos/publ…
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Arbitrum DAO page: the wind-down of Arbitrum Gaming Ventures, the DAO's gaming venture fund. Token holders voted 191m $ARB to 8k to stop new investments and send about 143.7m ARB back to the treasury. caper.network/wiki/daos/netw…
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AxonDAO, a decentralized-science network built around member-owned health data, also runs its own GPU cluster: NVIDIA B200s deployed in March 2026 and rented to enterprise customers for AI and life-sciences research.
It publishes the cluster's earnings on a public dashboard. By 8 October its GPUs had grossed $157k.
That gives it something most DAOs lack: a customer paying for a service, rather than a treasury spent down from a token sale.
caper.network/wiki/desci/eco…
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Most token votes weigh a ballot by what the voter held at one earlier block. Compound's Governor reads it at the block the vote opened; a Snapshot space reads it at the block the proposal names. Nothing the voter does after that block changes the count, so a holder can sell their whole position and still vote with it, or vote first and sell a minute later.
A caper reads the voter's balance twice: when they cast the ballot, and again when the ballots are counted. The smaller of the two counts. A member who votes with a large position and sells half of it before the count is counted at half, and one who sells all of it is counted at nothing. A voter who holds none of the caper's tokens when they cast cannot vote at all.
caper.network/wiki/governanc…
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In July 2024 a group of holders bought $COMP on the open market and used it to pass Compound Proposal 289. It would have moved about 499,000 COMP of the DAO's reserves, some $24m, into a yield vault the group would influence. It passed 682,000 votes to 634,000 and was withdrawn after a public backlash. Compound weighs a vote by the COMP behind it, so tokens bought that month counted the same as tokens held since launch.
A caper weighs a holding together with a record of taking part. Members add to that record only by casting ballots, and nobody can buy it, borrow it or receive it from another member. A holder who buys a large position the week before a vote brings one ballot's worth of record: the one they cast. Members who have voted on every proposal for a year bring the record of all of those votes.
Stake still counts: of two members with the same record, the larger holder weighs more.
caper.network/wiki/governanc…
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Caper Network retweeted
Governance is often treated as overhead until something breaks.
If we want it to receive serious attention and investment, we need to become better at explaining what risk it prevents, what value it protects, and what better governance actually changes.
luma.com/sh98otew
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