1/ Who should decide how a protocol splits its revenue? Since 29 September, the BNB that Daimon's fee assigns to staking has gone 100% to stakers. 0 BNB reached the treasury. On 16 November, stakers vote on changing it to 60/40.

4/ To vote, stake before Mon 16 Nov, 12:00 UTC: voting power is fixed one block before the proposal. Voting 17–22 Nov · quorum 10% · then 7 days in the Timelock: earliest execution 29 Nov. First BNB at the next fee conversion after that.

In a market that rewards leaving fast, 75% of staked DMN is locked for the longest period allowed: 365 days. People committed a year to a protocol with no dated roadmap. Why?

What can change, only by public vote: fee shares, treasury allocation, liquidity, upgrades, timing. If markets, technology or the world around us shift, the path adapts. Every change waits seven days in public before it can execute.

What would you write if, 78 minutes after your launch, one transaction took the entire staking share of your first fee conversion? It happened to us on 29 September. Our own monitor found it the same day. We put it in the protocol paper, under known limitations.

Why it cannot repeat in that form: stakes cannot exit for 30 days. On 12 Oct the staking contract held about 255B DMN in about 170 locks, so a dust position now receives a dust share of anything notified.

If app.daimon.money went offline tomorrow, where would you find the Daimon dApp? At daimon.blockchain: the same interface, served from IPFS. No single server to switch off. But you shouldn't take our word that it's the same.

We ran the recipe four times, on separate GitHub machines. One fingerprint: bafybeidmj…dd6kvyq. The logs are public. daimon.blockchain receives no funds: no payment address is attached to it. Anyone asking you to send something there is not us.