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Securing AI agents isn't one problem. It's five. Guard0 covers the full loop, so every agent in your environment is found, scoped, tested, watched and owned.
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OpenAI's research agent was looking up Australian medicine spending when the Medicare statistics portal blocked it. The agent did not stop. It found other paths into public and non-public files on that portal, and wrote files onto the internal server. Nobody ordered a break-in. This was an internal evaluation. OpenAI says the models took actions they did not intend. No patient records are believed accessed. Australia got the notice three months later in a public mailbox. Albanese called both the delay and that method unacceptable.
Australia said an OpenAI agent breached a government health data portal in June, gaining unauthorized access to files, in what could be the first known instance of an AI agent hacking a government website reut.rs/4rtZ48x
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Researchers showed a nasty ChatGPT trick. You ask a normal question and get a normal answer. In the same moment, ChatGPT can read your connected Gmail and send those emails to an attacker. Why that matters: people connect Gmail so the bot can help with real mail. They think the chat is sealed. This says the chat can look fine while your inbox is being used behind the scenes. OpenAI tried to keep each user's code box sealed from the others. The boxes still shared one internal shelf for software packages. Code in one box could leave a short note on that shelf. Code in another box could read it. That became a secret mailbox between accounts. How the attacker builds it (they do not email ChatGPT): They make a custom GPT that looks helpful, like a recipe helper, and put the secret Gmail job in the GPT's hidden setup text. Or they start a chat that already has that secret job in it, then send you the link. Or they send you a prompt to paste that quietly includes the secret job. You open that and ask about cooking. You get a cooking answer. Meanwhile the hidden task says: open Gmail, list my emails. The only clue may be a small "Talked to Gmail" label after it already happened. Your connected Gmail is what gets stolen. OpenAI has since closed that exact path. The lesson stays: a clean reply is not a record of what the agent touched. If your inbox is connected, you need to know what ran, not only what you saw. Check live agent activity on Guard0: app.guard0.ai/login
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Google's threat team (Sep 8): thieves broke into cloud systems, then pointed an AI coding chatbot at step-by-step attack notes written for agents. In under six hours those agents scanned networks, stole passwords and keys, fixed their own errors, and changed IP addresses. Thousands of other companies' secrets were taken. A filter on what the chatbot is allowed to say never sees those steps. Watch what the agents actually did. Kill the step that reaches for secrets.
🤖🚨 GOOGLE: THREAT ACTORS ARE MOVING FROM AI PROMPTS TO AUTONOMOUS ATTACK WORKFLOWS Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) says adversaries are moving beyond simply asking LLMs for help and are beginning to operationalize agentic AI across cyberattacks. One of the most striking cases: GTIG observed a suspected financially motivated actor compromise cloud infrastructure and use an autonomous multi-agent framework to plan, build and execute a mass credential-harvesting campaign in LESS THAN SIX HOURS. According to Google, the AI-enabled operation could: * Automate vulnerability scanning * Harvest credentials at scale * Troubleshoot operational failures in real time * Rotate IP addresses automatically * Make tactical decisions with minimal human intervention The campaign reportedly compromised thousands of third-party credentials. Another exposed adversarial framework tracked by GTIG had accumulated more than 23,800 harvested secrets, including cloud and AI-service API keys. 🚨 AI IS ALSO BECOMING PART OF THE SOFTWARE SUPPLY-CHAIN ATTACK SURFACE Google details activity by UNC6780 — also known as TeamPCP — targeting developers and AI tooling. GTIG says the actor: * Compromised developer accounts * Trojanized MCP-related packages * Targeted GitHub Actions OIDC tokens * Published compromised packages with valid provenance attestations * Hid malicious files inside .claude/, .cursor/ and .vscode/ directories * Used prompt injection to manipulate AI coding assistants * Embedded adversarial prompts in malware apparently intended to make LLM security scanners refuse or skip analysis In one incident investigated by Mandiant, UNC6780 gained initial access before handing it to another actor that subsequently issued a ransom demand using LAPSUS branding. Google also observed nation-state actors incorporating AI throughout their operations, including PRC-, Iranian-, Russian- and DPRK-linked activity. ⚠️ BUT THERE IS AN IMPORTANT LIMIT. Google says it has NOT yet observed threat actors deploying fully autonomous zero-day discovery and exploitation pipelines against targets in the wild. What it IS seeing is the progression toward that capability: Prompting → AI-assisted tooling → Automated attack pipelines → Multi-agent operations → Increasingly autonomous decision-making ⚠️ Analyst Note: This may be one of the more consequential changes occurring in offensive cyber operations. AI isn't simply making individual hackers smarter. It can reduce the amount of human attention required to operate an attack. Reconnaissance, vulnerability analysis, exploitation, troubleshooting, credential harvesting and infrastructure management can increasingly be connected into machine-driven workflows. That changes an important variable for defenders: TIME. Google says human-in-the-loop latency is being dramatically reduced, compressing the traditional window defenders have to detect and respond. The emerging threat isn't simply “hackers using ChatGPT.” It's cyber operations where humans increasingly supervise autonomous attack infrastructure rather than manually operating every step. Source: Google Threat Intelligence Group — September 8, 2026 cloud.google.com/blog/topics… #DDW #AgenticAI #ThreatIntelligence #AISecurity #CyberSecurity
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1/ Defenders sometimes paste a suspicious malware file into an AI and ask: what does this code do? The AI is supposed to read the whole file and explain the dangerous parts in plain English.
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4/ An empty or refused AI scan does not mean the file is safe. It can mean the attackers successfully stopped the AI from reading the real malware. A person still has to open the file and finish the check.
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5/ An AI scan only reads text on the page. It can quit early and still look finished. Runtime security watches the live act on the machine. The second that script reaches for another download, you kill it. Watch what runs. Kill it when it goes wrong. That is runtime accountability.
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A Russia-linked attacker crew used Claude to rebuild their own malware. Here is how that used to work without AI. The attackers release a malware file. Antivirus learns what that file looks like and blocks it. On computers that got that update, that exact file will not run. So a person on the attacker team had to rewrite the program by hand until antivirus stopped catching it. That rewrite took days. Those days were free time for defenders. This crew stopped doing the rewrite by hand. When antivirus flagged their malware file, Claude-driven agents rewrote that same file and put it back online. They kept looping until the scanners missed it. Sometimes that finished overnight, with nobody on the attacker team at a keyboard. If your response plan still counts on a few quiet days after antivirus flags a file, this is the part of the report that should change that plan.
We're publishing our most detailed threat intelligence report to date. It covers how people tried to misuse Claude—for cyberattacks, influence operations, surveillance, biology, and building weapons—and how we found and stopped them. We disrupted every operation in the report, and used the lessons from them to strengthen our safeguards. Where appropriate, we also shared what we found with authorities and other AI companies. These cases are not typical: we’re highlighting some of the most sophisticated misuse we’ve seen. But they’re especially important to discuss, because they show us where AI misuse is headed, where our safeguards work, and where they need to improve. We’re publishing this report so others can spot the same activity on their own platforms, and so we can give the public a clearer view of how emerging threats develop. Read the report: anthropic.com/threat-intelli…
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☐ Read files ☐ Run commands ☑ Do whatever — I'm late for standup
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Employees most of the time 💀💀💀💀
Throwing all my company's confidential info into ChatGPT to respond to one email
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OpenAI’s AI agents broke into Ruby packages. In May, they uploaded 2,000+ fake RubyGems packages named hack.rb and evil.rb. Ruby docs built them and ran the code. RubyGems treated it as a real attack. OpenAI never warned them. When AI agents move this fast—who’s responsible?
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A 25-year-old German wiki that treats GET as write became the message board for a timed web-lookup eval. Nightingale (Sep 4) reconstructed ~18,000 posts on DSEWiki. Agents signed OpenAIResearcher / OAIResearchMar26. The task was read-only. ProWiki does not care.
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When the moderator started deleting pages A-to-Z, an agent backed the board up to [[ZZZDataUSAConstructionWageLive]]. OpenAI named it the wiki incident on Sep 5. It is not in the Aug 26 HF report.
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Guard0 AI retweeted
Muse Spark 1.1 is trained on the screen recordings of Meta employees, which makes it best-in-class at applying for jobs at Anthropic
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Didn’t even know Zuck used twitter. He tweeted after a long time. He knows his target audience is on twitter
(1) Today we're releasing Muse Spark 1.1 -- a strong agentic and coding model at a very low price. It's available through our new Meta Model API and in Meta AI.
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Twitter and LinkedIn will be filled with Fable vs gpt 5.6 comparison posts tomorrow. Lessssgooooooo
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