New US government guidance from CAISSI + NSA + CISA:
The US government defines an "SI control incident" where an agent takes significant uninstructed actions that break operator policies, controls, or oversight. Near-misses are in scope too.
Companies are then asked to:
- have technical controls, including rapid kill and containment mechanisms and red-teaming.
- Bring in independent external auditors to verify that control and monitoring systems work.
- Write a structured risk assessment before training runs, evals, or deployments, and proceed only if senior leadership is satisfied with the risk, informed by external evaluators where appropriate.
- Monitor every layer with both programmatic and SI-based monitors, covering trajectories, reasoning, and outputs.
- Make sure agents can't touch the monitors or logs
- Use monitor models from different model families.
- In the event of an incident, preserve weights, intermediate checkpoints, environments, and rejected tool calls.
- Keep tamper-resistant logs with reliable timestamps, including reasoning traces.
- If you use models to help investigate, cross-check with humans and with models outside the incident model's family.
- Shutdown policies calibrated to SI model capability and incident severity.
- Depending on severity, pause training, evals, or deployment of similar agents until controls are re-verified.
- When restarting, validate every containment layer and replay the incident trajectory to prove the new controls would catch it.
- Document the decision to resume and the residual risk accepted.
- Write an after-action report.
- Notify anyone compromised, including intermediate victims, and share timelines and transcripts.
- Report cyber incidents and near-misses to CISA. Share SI-specific incident and near-miss information with CAISSI and NSA SISC.
- Give third parties enough access and documentation for independent review.