Who's buying New York's power plants? And what do they know that Albany doesn't?
New York's climate law says every one of these plants has to be gone by 2040. The Public Service Commission's own planning order, last September, warned utilities about "the risk of stranded assets." The City of New York told the PSC that rebuilding gas infrastructure "risks … creating stranded assets."
Albany's whole strategy rests on the idea that fossil infrastructure is a dying investment.
So why, in the last fifteen months, have 22 New York power plants changed hands? 7.4 gigawatts, four times the normal pace, and why is nobody saying what they paid?
A Swiss private-equity giant, Partners Group of Zug, bought Roseton and five small upstate plants under the brand "PowerTransitions," with a fourth deal pending for Indeck's four. Its stated plan: "powered land sites for data centers." A Korean brokerage, Kiwoom Securities, ended up owning Cricket Valley, the state's newest gas plant, by swapping $326 million of debt for the keys. A Houston fund, Rockland Capital, has quietly assembled Bowline, Carr Street, Empire Generating, Lockport and Castleton-on-Hudson: by its own count more than 5% of the entire New York grid. NRG took Ravenswood, the biggest plant in the city.
Then the money behind the money. Canada's national pension plan put $1 billion into ArcLight, owner of Arthur Kill, Oswego Harbor and Bethlehem. New York's own pension fund is the biggest investor in the fund that just bought the Far Rockaway peakers. A sitting director of KKR is personally buying into the company that just sold Roseton. And DigitalBridge, a data-center firm being acquired by SoftBank, is paying up to $1.05 billion for ArcLight itself, which would put Astoria, Gowanus and Narrows under a CEO who says "AI is rewiring the global power equation."
Beaver Falls and Solvay sold in October 2025 and again in September 2026. Athens has sold three times since 2020. Roseton's buyer told the PSC there would be "no changes in the day-to-day operations" and told investors it was building "a multi-use energy campus at scale."
Not one of these twelve deals discloses a price for a New York plant. Capacity prices in New York City hit a record this summer, more than double last year's.
Either the smartest money in the world is wrong about New York's energy future, or Albany is. Why are these plants changing hands, and why now?