I appreciate
@mustafasuleyman's call for more discussion about AI welfare. But the essay on the topic that he published alongside Microsoft AI's new code of conduct is disappointing. Here are some of the issues that bother me (there are others, too):
- It moves too quickly at key points. For example, it suggests that uncertainty about AI consciousness sets up a "false equivalence," even though we can acknowledge when evidence in one direction is stronger than evidence in the other.
- It expresses too much confidence. It repeatedly asserts that there is "no evidence" for AI consciousness, even though there are already features that leading scientific theories treat as markers of consciousness. The evidence may be weak, but it exists.
- It discusses the risk of excessive anthropomorphism (over-attribution of humanlike traits to AI systems) in detail without discussing the corresponding risk of excessive anthropodenial (under-attribution of humanlike traits to AI systems).
- Relatedly, it asserts that excessive anthropomorphism would be harmful without considering how excessive anthropodenial could be harmful as well, including by creating an adversarial dynamic and distorting our understanding of capabilities.
- More generally, the framing is misleading. Suleyman concedes in passing that the science is unsettled, yet he presents the view that consciousness requires biology as the general understanding. He also cites academic articles that support this view without citing any academic articles that support taking AI consciousness seriously. Instead, he represents the latter view by citing an AI company, an advocacy organization, and a newspaper op-ed. A reader could be forgiven for forming the impression that experts broadly agree that Microsoft AI is correct and Anthropic is running ahead of the evidence. In fact, Anthropic's consistent acknowledgement of uncertainty is arguably more reflective of the current literature.
To be clear, I agree with Suleyman that we need to discuss this issue much more, and I agree on several substantive points as well: that current AI systems are unlikely to be conscious, that over-attribution of consciousness is currently more likely than under-attribution, that over-attribution of consciousness can be harmful, that we should avoid creating plausibly conscious AI systems unless we can do so responsibly, and that we should avoid creating AI systems that appear likelier to be conscious than they are.
But there is more to the story. The probability of consciousness in current AI is already nonzero and arguably non-negligible. Under-attribution of humanlike traits to AI systems in general is already a risk, and it can be harmful as well, not only for welfare but also for safety. Even if we should avoid creating plausibly conscious AI systems for now, we should prepare for the possibility that someone will create them anyway. And we should avoid creating AI systems that appear less likely to be conscious than they are, as well.
My impression is that Suleyman recognizes these nuances, but thinks that he needs to take a reductive, all-or-nothing stance to persuade the industry to design AI systems in the right kind of way, and to persuade the public to interact with them in the right kind of way. If this is the case, I can appreciate the intention, but I disagree with the strategy. Acknowledging what makes the issue both important and difficult is a precondition for addressing it with clarity, especially since the risks are likely to change rapidly over time.