🚨Today is publication day for my book, "Aligning Election Law"!
The book argues that promoting alignment between governmental outputs and popular preferences should be an overarching goal of election law.
You can buy the book at the link below.
global.oup.com/academic/prod…
What's striking about this "ballot stacking" scheme is that it's largely negated by Alaska's instant-runoff voting system. E.g., if someone ranks the Dan Sullivans 1-2 (in either order), the result is exactly the same after preferences are transferred.
nytimes.com/2026/10/28/us/po…
In a state without IRV, on the other hand, a voter voting for the wrong Dan Sullivan would actually waste her vote.
So thank goodness for Alaska's quirky system!
I put together some more extended thoughts on the NYT's partisan gerrymandering analysis and what it means for Wisconsin's map.
electionlawblog.org/2026/the…
In Wisconsin, "[t]he simulations ... suggest [a 6-2 Republican advantage] is exactly what one should expect from a party-blind map."
This is why we're challenging the plan on ANTI-COMPETITIVE grounds. The simulations strongly support that distinct claim.
nytimes.com/interactive/2026…
In Wisconsin, "[t]he simulations ... suggest [a 6-2 Republican advantage] is exactly what one should expect from a party-blind map."
This is why we're challenging the plan on ANTI-COMPETITIVE grounds. The simulations strongly support that distinct claim.
nytimes.com/interactive/2026…
I just posted this book chapter on the value of alignment -- the government doing what the people want -- in comparative perspective. It's part of a forthcoming volume edited by Shreya Atrey and Ros Dixon.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.…
Here's the abstract:
Beyond elections, the courts have intervened to fix distortions of the legislative process and to address issues including secession, corruption, broadcasting, and treatymaking.
In sum, this rich body of case law establishes that alignment operating as a constitutional value isn't some fanciful academic notion. Rather, it's a tangible legal reality in constitutional systems around the globe.
New paper by @ruthgreenwood and me: "The Death and Rebirth of Vote Dilution," forthcoming in the Supreme Court Review.
We show how the Court tried to kill the concept of racial vote dilution in Callais -- and why this idea will never die.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.…
Nor does Callais impede race-neutral strategies that nevertheless stop much racial vote dilution. Two of these approaches are familiar: prohibitions of partisan gerrymandering and systems of proportional representation.
We further propose a cause of action for non-racial vote dilution. This novel claim would work just like its racial analogue-except it would revolve entirely around a non-racial cleavage.