Very important statement by
@iaeaorg DG
@rafaelmgrossi on Iran's nuclear program here, with 2 critical points worth zooming in on for policymakers as they weigh the costs and benefits of more strikes or staying the course against the balance sheet of the past on counterproliferation measures against Iran:
1) While the military "win" of the 12-Day War in the counterproliferation space was ending Iranian enrichment at declared facilities and targeting the regime's weaponization sites and scientists, the trade off was the loss of IAEA access at targeted nuclear facilities, implementation of the CSA, and the inability to comment on diversion of nuclear material.
Grossi below 👇
"Maintaining continuity of knowledge is crucial in any verification and monitoring process. Iran has not provided the requested information and access so that the IAEA can verify previously declared nuclear material at Iran’s facilities under safeguards, both those that have been affected by military attacks and those that have not... as of today the IAEA has not been able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under Iran’s CSA. This can and must be rectified."
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2) Amid all the talk of Pickaxe, does anyone remember Isfahan? Not the tunnels for storage of enriched uranium in canisters, but the plan for a new enrichment plant the regime talked about last June. The IAEA was supposed to go to this new facility in Isfahan on June 13, 2025, but the war started earlier that day. The status of the facility remains unknown, but it is assessed that the location is at/near the bigger Isfahan nuclear complex (technically, the NITC). One day before the start of the 12-Day War, Iran told the IAEA that facility will be at the Nuclear Reactors Fuel Company (NRFC). During the 12-Day War, both Israel and the U.S. struck different portions of the broader Isfahan complex. It is unclear if either did so again in the 40-Day War in 2026.
Grossi below👇
"Information on and access to the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant, declared by Iran immediately before the military attacks of June 2025, is necessary so that our inspectors can verify the status of the facility for safeguards purposes, and whether it contains nuclear material. Iran had agreed, back in 2025, to allow our inspectors to access this facility. The commencement of the attacks prevented our inspectors from going to the site and since then Iran has not accepted the Agency’s repeated requests for access."