27 new markets on Ult. Perps on Anthropic, Reliance Industries, Lam Research, Intercontinental Exchange, and 8 more, plus 15 Cronos tokens. ult.trade/x

CRO's first buyback and burn is done. This is the first in a planned monthly programme. Trading on Ult and token launches on Cronos Launch generate fees. Ult fees are used to buy back CRO and Cronos Launch fees are unwrapped, and all of it is burned onchain. Burned: 1,791,534.14 CRO Tx: explorer.cronos.com/tx/0xda0… Ult and Cronos Launch went live in September, so this burn covers the first weeks of fees. Each burn will be posted with its transaction, and the amount burned depends on the fees collected that month.

We could explain it. Or you could rip it. Pokémon, MLB, NBA, and NFL card packs are now live. New users, your first 5 rips are on us. Get in on the action on @ogcomrips now.

Security update We want to be fully transparent following a security incident: user funds and wallets were NOT affected, and the total loss from this incident was around 1 ETH, roughly $2,000, from a bridge fee wallet. NOTHING more. We want to explain what this was, and what it was not. On 26 October, we detected that attackers had gained access to part of our internal infrastructure through an outdated legacy partner website. We have been working around the clock internally and with independent forensics firms. On your funds: Socios.com wallets are self-custodial smart-contract wallets. Every transaction must be approved with the user's own passkey, which NEVER leaves their device. Neither Socios.com nor anyone else can move user funds without that approval. What else we have confirmed: • Our company multisigs were NOT compromised, in code or keys. • The code for our core smart contracts and treasury was NOT altered. • Our digital asset treasury, and CHZ and Fan Token minting, were NOT impacted. • Around 1 ETH was taken from 7 hot wallets used to pay bridge fees. That is the full extent of the funds lost. The 7 wallets are listed below and every transaction is public on Etherscan. 0x4b045692540E6B7AfDE44cdad60136d170efc623 0xb0AdF650ABDc7d2d5ac7366888ab492e9Df8589A 0x52f30AefB50B5d271d93A10730088733Bdbe31E0 0x1Cb83A71d81DaCe297975e377777c94a32d9D5dD 0xAE68F408160C40d508834734aC5bEd773a36e9D2 0x3665dfcdaf8310684c24592b017D986A993320e6 0x252B5CA6c838ae47508c1eA72Dd73b58c607Af0f • The attackers accessed an encrypted user database. We have NO evidence it was extracted, and NO evidence that passwords or KYC documents were exposed. Regulators have been notified in line with GDPR and MFSA/MiCA requirements already. What we have done: every key and credential has been rotated. The bridge is paused and all relayers revoked. We have moved the bridge wallets into institutional custody (see our previous post for the addresses). What you should do: • Never share your passkey or recovery kit. We will never DM you asking for it. • Use only our official channels. We have paused the governance portal as a precaution and expect to reopen it within the next few hours. We will post again when it is back. Thank you for your patience and your trust.