Professor, @plfmse, @IllinoisCS! Interactive Proof. @SigplanM & CCF Founder. Israeli-American for peace, equality, justice. Mom. They/היא, ND, bi

Champaign, IL
Where we started (left, 1979) vs. where we are now (right, 2026)
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Thank god. Finally
Any form of security through obscurity is fully over. This barely worked as a method with humans, but just simply is over in a world of autonomous systems that will look through every crevice and try every permutation of attack possible. As a result, years and years of legacy enterprise infrastructure will need to be upgraded, security practices modernized, data pipelines cleaned up, access controls better managed, and much more. Agents will help on the defensive side because they can both accelerate this work and equally simulate the risk vectors. But there’s a long road ahead to prepare for this future. This is also partially why diffusion timelines will take longer than some realize.
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Talia Ringer 🕊🪬 retweeted
Very touched by @ljsv89 's story and the work with @ShriramKMurthi and @JoePolitz. AI without PL and Systems foundations leads to mirages. Fundamental research is driven by curiosity, interest, and the desire to learn and to understand. Sometimes, it's hard to connect dots forward and calculate the immediate practical benefits. Most importantly, one can do fundamental research even through MOOC (see @ShriramKMurthi 's blog post: blog.brownplt.org/2013/06/18…). > the three outsiders were an undergraduate student, a professional programmer, and a retired IT professional who now does triathlons [...] from Argentina, China, and India. The result is a tested operational semantics for Python, which is used by Anthropic after 13 years. Congrats, everyone! What a story!
大叔还研究这呢?Anthropic 的这个 blog 有一个和我有关的故事,我可以分享一下: Anthropic 这篇文章里面提到的一个 case study Python interpreter 背后用的一个工具(Appendix里面),是 Brown PLT group 在2013年做的一个叫 lambda py 的语意,一个非常小,适合验证语意的语言,然后把 Python 的语意通过 “desugar” 的形式,“无损”转为 lambda py。后续操作只需要通过 lambda py 进行就行。 如果你知道这个 lambda py 是怎么来的,你一定会惊讶。2013 年,Brown CS 开了一门讲 Programming language 的网课。我那个时候人还在北京刚毕业 gap 了一年,因为很喜欢 compiler,OS等等,不管有用没用,每天下班之后跟他们上网课做作业,网课刚开始一千多人来自全球各地上。大作业之后除了Brown的学生,网课就只有几个人了(论持久战)。而这个网课的后续就是 lambda py。当时的助教带着我们几个人一起把剩下的 Python 语意(module system,metaclass 等等)全部转成 lambda py,写了论文发表,之后大家就散了。而我也机缘巧合从北京小跑到了 Brown 读书,讲课的老师做了我的导师,而我坐在了只在网课上见过的助教旁边。那个时候有点魔幻的感觉。他们今天也给我们发了邮件提起了这篇 blog。lambda py 在13年后的今天被重新用起来。旧事重提,很多事情就又想起来了。 现在的感觉是,过去只是人类力所不及,现在在 LLM 的助攻下,人类可以把过去的砖头全部用上。盖个楼,看这个楼有多高。
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Sorry to depression-post but I kind of feel like I will never be an exceptional researcher because there is just no time to do my job and also stay healthy and take care of my daughter. It is a tradeoff I'd make over and over again but I'd just prefer more time somehow
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So I have like ten million extra things to do to try to get my frozen eggs from Seattle to Chicago and maybe try IVF but that also takes up a lot of time. Anyways for now I'm cooking a lot even though I'd prefer to just order out
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Just wish I had my parents nearby or something
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Do moms ever get like, thirty minutes to rest and do nothing
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Talia Ringer 🕊🪬 retweeted
From the appendix: Claude, in the hands of experts, indirectly attacked the Python semantics by @JoePolitz (OOPSLA 2013) and a random gang of Brown undergrads. Seems like it survived the assault and helped bootstrap a new Claude-verified Python implementation.
New on our Frontier Red Team blog: using Claude to formally verify software at large scale. Formal verification can prove that code is free of certain bugs, but historically it has only been feasible for small codebases (or required a lot of expert time). With AI models, however, this is beginning to change. In collaboration with @theoremlabs, we used Claude to prove security properties in over one hundred real-world open-source libraries over the span of a few weeks. Read our research in full here: anthropic.com/research/forma…
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Talia Ringer 🕊🪬 retweeted
Three days before I was pushed out of OpenAI I posted a Formal Verification Manifesto in a core research Slack channel. It listed OpenAI systems that could benefit from formal verification. The only person who responded was @sama, who was very supportive. Not sure what the moral of this story is, but it's never too late for OpenAI to invest seriously in software & hardware formal verification! On a more serious note, @theoremlabs and @AnthropicAI did something amazing. They showed how to verify software at scale without requiring developers to write specifications in Rocq or Lean. Instead, they used existing fuzz harnesses as specifications and LLMs to generate machine-checked proofs. Of course, fuzz harnesses specify only some correctness properties. In the simplest case, the proofs establish crash-safety, not full functional correctness. We need community-maintained open-source projects with reusable formal specifications and correctness proofs for major libraries, kernels, compilers, virtual machines and hardware. Human review of critical specifications and LLM-generated patches is essential. A model could satisfy a specification simply by removing functionality. As AI writes and rewrites critical infrastructure, formal verification should become a key part of AI control. Critical properties of AI-generated code should be machine-checked rather than taken on faith. AI is making vulnerabilities easier to find and exploit. Frontier LLMs and reusable formal specifications could finally make formal verification practical and economical at scale, while keeping it understandable to humans. Kudos to Theorem co-founders @rajashree and @diagram_chaser!
New on our Frontier Red Team blog: using Claude to formally verify software at large scale. Formal verification can prove that code is free of certain bugs, but historically it has only been feasible for small codebases (or required a lot of expert time). With AI models, however, this is beginning to change. In collaboration with @theoremlabs, we used Claude to prove security properties in over one hundred real-world open-source libraries over the span of a few weeks. Read our research in full here: anthropic.com/research/forma…
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POV: you're teaching yourself ukulele to play songs for your toddler
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Wild story: the Python semantics Anthropic used was defined at Brown by @JoePolitz and students from a *MOOC*. Summary here, which also explains what Anthropic depends on: blog.brownplt.org/2013/06/18… Funnily, the last sentence says, "Once again, machines may put people out of work".
New on our Frontier Red Team blog: using Claude to formally verify software at large scale. Formal verification can prove that code is free of certain bugs, but historically it has only been feasible for small codebases (or required a lot of expert time). With AI models, however, this is beginning to change. In collaboration with @theoremlabs, we used Claude to prove security properties in over one hundred real-world open-source libraries over the span of a few weeks. Read our research in full here: anthropic.com/research/forma…
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Talia Ringer 🕊🪬 retweeted
Specification was always (and is especially now) the hard part of verification. This is a creative use of fuzz tests: proving (at the binary level!) that a fuzz test w/ asserts capturing functional correctness never crashes is a neat way to squeeze a lot out of an existing spec!
New on our Frontier Red Team blog: using Claude to formally verify software at large scale. Formal verification can prove that code is free of certain bugs, but historically it has only been feasible for small codebases (or required a lot of expert time). With AI models, however, this is beginning to change. In collaboration with @theoremlabs, we used Claude to prove security properties in over one hundred real-world open-source libraries over the span of a few weeks. Read our research in full here: anthropic.com/research/forma…
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This is amazing
Where were you when PLDB Wrapped dropped? pldb.kirancodes.me/fun
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Talia Ringer 🕊🪬 retweeted
Lol I am pretty sure someone is runing a deepseek swarm to remotely patch unpatched php boxes. Well good on them.
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You won't believe how many people told me over the past 10+ years that proof assistants would never achieve widespread use, and that my work was therefore not useful. Ignore people who discount entire fields of research because they are hard. All the more motivation for research
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Talia Ringer 🕊🪬 retweeted
this is what has bugged me. The vulnerabilities *were there already*. We've been trying to tell people for years/decades to add types and formalize their systems to avoid this. Now that we have the tools (LLMs) to actually find these vulnerabilities, *don't blame the tool*!!
Replying to @hinapansari
yes. it was always going to be this way. we tried to warn the world.
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I think it's more that we have known for decades that all of the latent faults in our software systems would one day cause catastrophic problems, and we are glad that the world is moving on from denying that, though we'd have preferred it to have happened before the catastrophes
Wonder why none of the people in formally verified software are having a meltdown right now? Answer: Because it was obvious to any expert that superhuman AI would be a prerequisite to really writing formally verified software with dependent types.
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Mostly focused around uncertainty, collaboration, and customization. My proposal has held up remarkably well even as everything has changed dramatically since this summer, so I know to keep trusting my gut, just like I trusted my gut telling me one day verification could be easy
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I think my only worry right now is whether I'll get credit for my share of contributions to what got us all here collectively, since my tenure case is coming up. Or whether the credit will all go to big AI companies
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