Military and technology analyst. Fellow @BGCCIH. PhD from @GWtweets. Previously @BelferCenter, @UofT. Press inquiries: send a DM and include your email
Toronto
- Tweets 12,563
- Following 725
- Followers 6,887
- Likes 28,312
Pinned Tweet
Although I do not plan to delete this account or my threads and posts, I do not anticipate doing much posting or writing here going forward. I will be writing on my website; I am working on finalizing some things. spasconsulting.com/
2
11
16,107
This is part of the appeal of hypersonic boost-glide vehicles (BGVs, also known as hypersonic glide vehicles, or HGVs). Note that there exists no public information on what would be understood as an Iranian BGV of conventional design. A stylized example of such a flight path:
I have no time for additional maps today, but I want to highlight how the maps I have recently shared are 2D depictions of a three-dimensional reality. Iranian ballistic missiles are not detected immediately after launch by such radars, but only once they are 100+ km in the sky.
2
4
47
2,710
I have no time for additional maps today, but I want to highlight how the maps I have recently shared are 2D depictions of a three-dimensional reality. Iranian ballistic missiles are not detected immediately after launch by such radars, but only once they are 100+ km in the sky.
The coverage offered by the forward-deployed American AN/TPY-2 radars (operating as early warning radars in Forward-Based Mode) deployed at Kurecik (Turkiye) and Har Qeren (in the Negev, Israel) in Map 1. Map 2 includes the AN/TPY-2 associated with a THAAD battery (i.e., operating in terminal mode) near Rahat, Israel.
9
74
6,259
Shahryar Pasandideh retweeted
Ballistic missile defence (BMD) dynamics in the Middle East will profoundly change once Saudi Arabia deploys all seven of the AN/TPY-2 radars it has on order. But there is a far more significant development on the horizon: the UAE is set to deploy its own Long-Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) in a configuration offering 360° coverage to support its THAAD batteries as well as its Patriot and other BMD systems more generally. We don't know where the UAE's LRDR, from which the ship-based AN/SPY-7 is derived, will be built, but it doesn't really make much of a difference given how it will likely offer a detection range of 3000 or more kilometers and thereby detect all ballistic missiles launched from Iran, as well as Yemen once these climb above the radar horizon.
LRDR is an S-band design, just like the ship-based AN/SPY-1, AN/SPY-6, and AN/SPY-7, and can, therefore, be used to support BMD interceptions and not simply provide early warning. The AN/FPS-132 ballistic missile early warning radar in Qatar, which Iran targeted back in March, is a UHF-band design not suitable for fire control, while the AN/TPY-2 associated with the THAAD system (and also used as a standalone early warning radar) operates in the higher frequency X-band. For the UAE, the LRDR will function as something analogous to "Aegis Ashore," although there is so far no indication that the UAE intends to acquire land- or sea-based RIM-174 (SM-6) and/or RIM-171 (SM-3) interceptors.
All things considered, this amounts to yet another area in which the Gulf Arab states are best off collaborating, but the UAE appears intent on going it alone in pursuit of "hermetic" defences. Saudi Arabia is reported to also be interested in the LRDR design, but recent events highlight why the UAE is unlikely to delegate this critically important function to Saudi Arabia.
For Iran, these and other forthcoming developments in the realm of ballistic missile defences will pressure its ballistic missile capabilities. Iran had multiple good reasons beyond Israel to pursue a massive expansion of its ballistic missile arsenal before the June 2025 Iran-Israel War. Time will tell whether Iran will manage to both reconstitute and expand its ballistic missile arsenal before the Gulf Arab states, as well as Israel and the United States more generally, manage to reconstitute, let alone qualitatively enhance, their ballistic missile defence capabilities.
A map depicting the notional coverage provided by seven THAAD batteries in Saudi Arabia. Refer to the quoted post for disclaimers about such depictions of notional coverage in general and the defended footprint of THAAD batteries in particular.
13
38
234
93,297
This map constitutes my preliminary take on the coverage provided by the two AN/TPY-2 radars associated with the forward-deployed American THAAD batteries as of 28 February/early March 2026. Iran successfully attacked the AN/TPY-2 radar near Muwaffaq as-Salti airbase in Jordan.
🇮🇷🇮🇱🇸🇦🇦🇪🇺🇸 The key issue to understand about the implications of the apparent neutralization of multiple AN/TPY-2 ballistic missile early warning radars is that no individual radar antenna has a 360° field of view. A maximum field of view of 120° is the norm, and early warning and acquisition/search radars often constantly rotate as a result. The AN/TYP-2 does not rotate (at all) and therefore offers highly sectored coverage. The AN/TPY-2 radar in Jordan was oriented toward ballistic missiles launched from Iran, not ballistic missiles launched by Ansarallah in Yemen. The AN/TPY-2 radars in Saudi Arabia and the UAE can similarly either be oriented toward Iran or toward Yemen.
Given the above, the implications of Iran's apparent neutralization of multiple AN/TPY-2—not exclusively owned and operated by the American military—radars can be quite profound. Uncertainty about the number of remaining Iranian long-range (~1000+ km range) ballistic missiles and associated launchers notwithstanding, the Gulf Arab states may now be far more vulnerable to ballistic missiles of this range and performance class. Moreover, Ansarallah's arsenal of Iranian-supplied ballistic missiles of this range and performance class has not yet been committed to this war, which means that the Gulf Arab states face major risks going forward, even if the number of surviving ballistic missiles and associated launchers within Iran drops to zero.
As I said in a post on 3 March discussing early reports of Iranian strikes on AN/TYP-2 radars, we are witnessing multiple simultaneous "campaigns" within a war. There are many non-independent dynamics underway. American and Israeli strikes are undoubtedly taking a very high toll on Iran, but war is an endurance race, and the Iranian war effort appears to be far from over, not least with the shadow of Ansarallah's potential activation and intervention hanging over the Gulf Arab states.
The attached map is from a post I wrote on the implications of Turkish ballistic missile development for Israel. It depicts the sectors/bearings that a ballistic missile defence radar based in Tel Aviv must cover to intercept ballistic missiles launched from Syria (a now historical threat), from Iran, and by Ansarallah in Yemen. I have spent a lot of time highlighting how profoundly the emergence of Ansarallah-controlled territory as a de facto forward-deployment area for Iranian strike munitions has reshaped regional military dynamics. This is primarily the result of the real estate/geography that Ansarallah occupies, and the implications that munitions launched from Yemen have for Gulf Arab and, to a lesser degree, Israeli air defences and ballistic missile defences. 1/
1
7
22
2,925
I've made ~10-20 maps of actual and notional BMD coverage over the past day. The following map gives an idea of what the ballistic missile early warning setup in the region looked like, and that is without accounting for radars in UAE, Qatar, and Saudi.
Some *preliminary* and *incomplete* maps of Israel's ballistic missile early warning radar coverage. Map 2 includes the coverage provided by the American AN/TPY-2 radar at Har Qeren (in forward-based mode). Some of Israel's ballistic missile early warning radars are contained inside domes, which makes it impossible to discern the radar orientation using satellite imagery. I am also unable to discern between ELM-2080 family designs in such instances, and I am more generally in need of the coordinates of the ELM-2090 radar pairing, each radar of which is built to adjust the orientation as required.
3
6
1,058
Unless I am mistaken, the two Indian ELM-2090 ballistic missile early warning radar sites near Udaipur and Bhopal, all four radars of which are contained within large domes, can rotate when required, but nevertheless have a finite field of view. I can make some assumptions about orientation, but this takes the fun out of depicting radar coverage on a map, not least when India faces ballistic missiles launched from both China and Pakistan. In any event, the Indian ELM-2090 sites offer an idea of what to look for in Israel and elsewhere, although the test site in Israel has a different configuration (image 3). If you have coordinates, please do share.
Some *preliminary* and *incomplete* maps of Israel's ballistic missile early warning radar coverage. Map 2 includes the coverage provided by the American AN/TPY-2 radar at Har Qeren (in forward-based mode). Some of Israel's ballistic missile early warning radars are contained inside domes, which makes it impossible to discern the radar orientation using satellite imagery. I am also unable to discern between ELM-2080 family designs in such instances, and I am more generally in need of the coordinates of the ELM-2090 radar pairing, each radar of which is built to adjust the orientation as required.
1
12
77
10,989
Some *preliminary* and *incomplete* maps of Israel's ballistic missile early warning radar coverage. Map 2 includes the coverage provided by the American AN/TPY-2 radar at Har Qeren (in forward-based mode). Some of Israel's ballistic missile early warning radars are contained inside domes, which makes it impossible to discern the radar orientation using satellite imagery. I am also unable to discern between ELM-2080 family designs in such instances, and I am more generally in need of the coordinates of the ELM-2090 radar pairing, each radar of which is built to adjust the orientation as required.
I plan to get around to making a map depicting the coverage of Israel's ballistic missile early warning radars, but will share the following for now. You are looking at an Israeli Green Pine early warning radar site ~40 km north of Eilat. This facility did not exist in 2023. It was constructed in early 2024, and said radar was deployed to this site so as to detect ballistic missiles launched against Israel from Yemen. Note that Ansarallah only publicly unveiled its Iranian-supplied longer-range ballistic missiles, with the range required to target even Eilat, in September 2023. See the quoted post to understand why this launch geometry dynamic is so significant for Iran not only vis-a-vis Israel but also others, such as Saudi Arabia (my posts with maps on Saudi Arabia's ballistic missile defence coverage from earlier today help convey the important but oft-overlooked dynamic). 1/
13
55
15,444
Combining the coverage of the coverage offered by the Israeli Green Pine radar north of Eilat and the forward-deployed American AN/TPY-2 radar (in terminal mode, associated with a THAAD battery) located near Rahat. This orientation is solely explained by the fact that Ansarallah's Iranian-supplied long-range ballistic missiles can reach Israel from northern Yemen.
I plan to get around to making a map depicting the coverage of Israel's ballistic missile early warning radars, but will share the following for now. You are looking at an Israeli Green Pine early warning radar site ~40 km north of Eilat. This facility did not exist in 2023. It was constructed in early 2024, and said radar was deployed to this site so as to detect ballistic missiles launched against Israel from Yemen. Note that Ansarallah only publicly unveiled its Iranian-supplied longer-range ballistic missiles, with the range required to target even Eilat, in September 2023. See the quoted post to understand why this launch geometry dynamic is so significant for Iran not only vis-a-vis Israel but also others, such as Saudi Arabia (my posts with maps on Saudi Arabia's ballistic missile defence coverage from earlier today help convey the important but oft-overlooked dynamic). 1/
8
35
3,966
The coverage offered by the forward-deployed American AN/TPY-2 radars (operating as early warning radars in Forward-Based Mode) deployed at Kurecik (Turkiye) and Har Qeren (in the Negev, Israel) in Map 1. Map 2 includes the AN/TPY-2 associated with a THAAD battery (i.e., operating in terminal mode) near Rahat, Israel.
Curiously, the U.S. THAAD battery deployed ~12 km NE of Rahat was oriented ~ESE in Dec 2024 and Mar 2025, the dates for which there is satellite imagery from Google Earth. This allowed the THAAD battery to intercept ballistic missiles launched from Yemen as well as parts of Iran.
3
11
102
26,574
Curiously, the U.S. THAAD battery deployed ~12 km NE of Rahat was oriented ~ESE in Dec 2024 and Mar 2025, the dates for which there is satellite imagery from Google Earth. This allowed the THAAD battery to intercept ballistic missiles launched from Yemen as well as parts of Iran.
I plan to get around to making a map depicting the coverage of Israel's ballistic missile early warning radars, but will share the following for now. You are looking at an Israeli Green Pine early warning radar site ~40 km north of Eilat. This facility did not exist in 2023. It was constructed in early 2024, and said radar was deployed to this site so as to detect ballistic missiles launched against Israel from Yemen. Note that Ansarallah only publicly unveiled its Iranian-supplied longer-range ballistic missiles, with the range required to target even Eilat, in September 2023. See the quoted post to understand why this launch geometry dynamic is so significant for Iran not only vis-a-vis Israel but also others, such as Saudi Arabia (my posts with maps on Saudi Arabia's ballistic missile defence coverage from earlier today help convey the important but oft-overlooked dynamic). 1/
1
9
61
38,070
Shahryar Pasandideh retweeted
Some maps depicting the notional coverage provided by 24x Patriot batteries and 3x THAAD batteries in Saudi Arabia, using simple wedges based on the notional location of associated engagement/fire control radars. Purple = ballistic missile defence (BMD) coverage (i.e., PAC-3 CRI/MSE and MIM-401 interceptors). Red = coverage against atmospheric targets for Patriot systems (i.e., PAC-2 interceptors). Map 1 includes PAC-2 coverage against atmospheric threats. Map 2 excludes PAC-2 coverage.
All the standard caveats about notional radar and air defence system coverage apply. Note that BMD coverage/defended footprints in particular are not wedge-shaped in practice, but the orientation of an AN/TPY-2 radar means that there is a directional constraint on THAAD coverage absent the presence of multiple AN/TPY-2 radars/THAAD batteries in a given area. To offer a better approximation of the defended footprint of THAAD batteries in Saudi Arabia, consider Map 3.
For the record, my comments in this clip are part of a longer interview in which I highlighted the primary causes of this now readily observable dynamic: the realities of radar coverage as it concerns ballistic missile defence, Saudi Arabia's geography in general as well as the highly dispersed nature of its oil infrastructure in particular, and the likelihood that Saudi Arabia is prioritizing the defence of its most important oil facilities, most of which are in its Eastern Province, over other still important sites, including Riyadh's international airport.
The reported depletion of Saudi Arabia's arsenal of ballistic missile defence interceptors for its Patriot batteries is only one part of this equation. I would have said the same a week ago, before Riyadh's international airport was hit on 6 October, and have consistently highlighted how the de facto forward deployment of Iranian strike munitions in Yemen has fundamentally reshaped the Iran-Gulf Arab military balance for reasons that are primarily rooted in the aforementioned factors, above all the limited coverage offered by the fire control/engagement radars associated with the Patriot system. This is why, in March, I kept characterizing the activation of Ansarallah as a "card" that Iran was best off not playing until a later date.
Note that there is nothing new or surprising about these dynamics. Ansarallah attacked the very same Saudi airport in November 2017 (image 1), which is to say approximately nine years ago, and I have been highlighting how Iranian transfers of strike munitions to Yemen have had the effect of degrading and diluting Saudi and Gulf Arab ballistic missile defence capabilities (image 2) since around that time.
5
40
289
115,518
I plan to get around to making a map depicting the coverage of Israel's ballistic missile early warning radars, but will share the following for now. You are looking at an Israeli Green Pine early warning radar site ~40 km north of Eilat. This facility did not exist in 2023. It was constructed in early 2024, and said radar was deployed to this site so as to detect ballistic missiles launched against Israel from Yemen. Note that Ansarallah only publicly unveiled its Iranian-supplied longer-range ballistic missiles, with the range required to target even Eilat, in September 2023. See the quoted post to understand why this launch geometry dynamic is so significant for Iran not only vis-a-vis Israel but also others, such as Saudi Arabia (my posts with maps on Saudi Arabia's ballistic missile defence coverage from earlier today help convey the important but oft-overlooked dynamic). 1/
🇮🇷🇮🇱🇸🇦🇦🇪🇺🇸 The key issue to understand about the implications of the apparent neutralization of multiple AN/TPY-2 ballistic missile early warning radars is that no individual radar antenna has a 360° field of view. A maximum field of view of 120° is the norm, and early warning and acquisition/search radars often constantly rotate as a result. The AN/TYP-2 does not rotate (at all) and therefore offers highly sectored coverage. The AN/TPY-2 radar in Jordan was oriented toward ballistic missiles launched from Iran, not ballistic missiles launched by Ansarallah in Yemen. The AN/TPY-2 radars in Saudi Arabia and the UAE can similarly either be oriented toward Iran or toward Yemen.
Given the above, the implications of Iran's apparent neutralization of multiple AN/TPY-2—not exclusively owned and operated by the American military—radars can be quite profound. Uncertainty about the number of remaining Iranian long-range (~1000+ km range) ballistic missiles and associated launchers notwithstanding, the Gulf Arab states may now be far more vulnerable to ballistic missiles of this range and performance class. Moreover, Ansarallah's arsenal of Iranian-supplied ballistic missiles of this range and performance class has not yet been committed to this war, which means that the Gulf Arab states face major risks going forward, even if the number of surviving ballistic missiles and associated launchers within Iran drops to zero.
As I said in a post on 3 March discussing early reports of Iranian strikes on AN/TYP-2 radars, we are witnessing multiple simultaneous "campaigns" within a war. There are many non-independent dynamics underway. American and Israeli strikes are undoubtedly taking a very high toll on Iran, but war is an endurance race, and the Iranian war effort appears to be far from over, not least with the shadow of Ansarallah's potential activation and intervention hanging over the Gulf Arab states.
The attached map is from a post I wrote on the implications of Turkish ballistic missile development for Israel. It depicts the sectors/bearings that a ballistic missile defence radar based in Tel Aviv must cover to intercept ballistic missiles launched from Syria (a now historical threat), from Iran, and by Ansarallah in Yemen. I have spent a lot of time highlighting how profoundly the emergence of Ansarallah-controlled territory as a de facto forward-deployment area for Iranian strike munitions has reshaped regional military dynamics. This is primarily the result of the real estate/geography that Ansarallah occupies, and the implications that munitions launched from Yemen have for Gulf Arab and, to a lesser degree, Israeli air defences and ballistic missile defences. 1/
1
31
145
38,341
Regarding the Saudi angle, wherein the de facto forward deployment of Iranian ballistic missiles to Yemen similarly complicates Saudi air defence planning, see:
Some maps depicting the notional coverage provided by 24x Patriot batteries and 3x THAAD batteries in Saudi Arabia, using simple wedges based on the notional location of associated engagement/fire control radars. Purple = ballistic missile defence (BMD) coverage (i.e., PAC-3 CRI/MSE and MIM-401 interceptors). Red = coverage against atmospheric targets for Patriot systems (i.e., PAC-2 interceptors). Map 1 includes PAC-2 coverage against atmospheric threats. Map 2 excludes PAC-2 coverage.
All the standard caveats about notional radar and air defence system coverage apply. Note that BMD coverage/defended footprints in particular are not wedge-shaped in practice, but the orientation of an AN/TPY-2 radar means that there is a directional constraint on THAAD coverage absent the presence of multiple AN/TPY-2 radars/THAAD batteries in a given area. To offer a better approximation of the defended footprint of THAAD batteries in Saudi Arabia, consider Map 3.
1
7
2,487
Thanks to geolocation by @GEOIMINT, it can now be said that an Iranian Shahed-107 or Shahed-101 mod strike drone penetrated some 20 km of Israeli airspace back in June 2025. This is, to my knowledge, the deepest confirmed penetration of Israeli airspace by a propeller-driven Iranian strike drone launched from Iran (or Iraq, i.e., leaving aside launches from Lebanon and Yemen). Note the absence of reports, including on social media and videos recorded by personal phones, of Iranian strike drones above Israel or even the distinct acoustic signatures thereof. This is not to say that Iran did not undertake such launches against Israel, especially during the June 2025 Iran-Israel War.
Given all the talk about Iran possibly hitting American and Gulf Arab ballistic missile early warning radars, including AN/TPY-2 radars associated with THAAD systems, it is not a bad time to remind everyone of this unusual and, to my knowledge, still unexplained, incident from the June 2025 Iran-Israel War in which the Israeli Air Force intercepted an Iranian propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drone in the immediate vicinity of what appears to be an Israeli Arrow ballistic missile defence system launcher. Do share information/a link if you know anything about this incident.
3
6
56
11,983
New aircraft shelters have been built at Taiwan's Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, which is located near the island's western coast.
🇨🇳🇹🇼 In Taiwan, as elsewhere, hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) ≠ HAS ≠ HAS. There is a lot of heterogeneity. The pics are from Taiwan. The video shows China's "super hardened HAS" design, which amounts to its third specific HAS design, one that has been built across China.
4
40
5,415
A map depicting the notional coverage provided by seven THAAD batteries in Saudi Arabia. Refer to the quoted post for disclaimers about such depictions of notional coverage in general and the defended footprint of THAAD batteries in particular.
Some maps depicting the notional coverage provided by 24x Patriot batteries and 3x THAAD batteries in Saudi Arabia, using simple wedges based on the notional location of associated engagement/fire control radars. Purple = ballistic missile defence (BMD) coverage (i.e., PAC-3 CRI/MSE and MIM-401 interceptors). Red = coverage against atmospheric targets for Patriot systems (i.e., PAC-2 interceptors). Map 1 includes PAC-2 coverage against atmospheric threats. Map 2 excludes PAC-2 coverage.
All the standard caveats about notional radar and air defence system coverage apply. Note that BMD coverage/defended footprints in particular are not wedge-shaped in practice, but the orientation of an AN/TPY-2 radar means that there is a directional constraint on THAAD coverage absent the presence of multiple AN/TPY-2 radars/THAAD batteries in a given area. To offer a better approximation of the defended footprint of THAAD batteries in Saudi Arabia, consider Map 3.
4
6
53
60,407