@SECNAV Hung Cao reported that the USS Theodore Roosevelt deployed on October 8 with a medium unmanned surface vessel, a first for a carrier strike group.

Weaponized cartel drones are proven to have been fielded since October 2017, with the interdiction of a 3DR Solo quadcopter with a papa bomba (potato bomb) along with four Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación(CJNG) operatives in Valtierrilla, Guanajuato during what was essentially a felony stop. As chronicled at SWJ–El Centro over the years, their deployment in Mexico has proliferated over the last decade, increasing in frequency and spreading geographically throughout the country and also to more cartels, their fragments, and operational units. Cartel counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) capabilities have also developed over this time period as the danger and ‘narco battlefield’ effectiveness of weaponized cartel drones have concurrently increased. To date, the vast majority of news reports, social media posts, and research products have been solely focused on rapidly evolving cartel weaponized drone capabilities—or more recently, the Mexican and US governmental C-CUAS responses against them—rather than on cartel C-UAS capabilities. This short opinion piece will provide a brief overview of where their capabilities have been trending. Very little public analysis has been published on this phenomena, quite possibly due to limited recognition of its importance as well as a lack of specialized expertise. The author’s expertise is derived from an intimate knowledge of cartel technology and weaponry utilization tracked and analyzed at El Centro and C/O Futures, LLC with which he is associated.

Abstract Layered counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) defense commonly combines detection, passive protection, non-kinetic defeat, and kinetic defeat. This essay examines those defensive functions in the specific context of first-person-view (#FPV) drones. This essay distinguishes these functions by their objects of action and identifies the mission environment as an under-articulated object of defensive action. To say that a defensive function “acts upon” an object means that the function is principally designed to change that object’s condition, although it may also produce secondary effects elsewhere. Environmental denial is not proposed as an additional defensive layer of counter-FPV defense. In this essay, layer and function describe different dimensions of defense: a layer identifies where an activity sits within the defensive architecture, whereas a function identifies what the activity is intended to change. Environmental denial is therefore a cross-cutting function rather than a separate layer because it acts on the mission environment across multiple stages of the engagement. By shaping the conditions under which an FPV drone must fly, approach, and attack, it changes the engagement inherited by subsequent defensive functions. #CUAS

"On September 14, 2019, a swarm of 18 drones and 7 cruise missiles targeted Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais, managing to bypass the sophisticated Patriot batteries intended to defend the sites. The attacks briefly halved the kingdom’s oil output and constituted the single largest disruption in the history of modern oil production. When a handful of low-cost weapons can defeat billions of dollars’ worth of conventional defense equipment, a nation must reconsider whether the strength of its land, air, and maritime forces alone accurately measures the level of operational readiness it requires. The lessons from #SaudiArabia in 2019 and the lessons from the most recent round of conflict in the Gulf have made it clear that only by incorporating a multi-layered counter-drone architecture, one that seamlessly fuses together detection, classification, and response, will #theGulf States be able to protect their conventional forces and defense infrastructures from becoming obsolete. Drawing on historical parallels and #Kuwait’s own recent experience, this essay aims to demonstrate that layered protection and cost sustainability should become essential measures of readiness in the region. For decades, Gulf states have relied heavily on the strength of their tanks, aircraft, and warships to measure operational readiness. The proliferation of low-cost, one-way attack drones has left these forces vulnerable to destruction. Being restricted by a lack of maneuverability, a Gulf state is consequently limited in its ability to protect and hold its ground. A multi-layered counter-drone architecture both enables and protects a nation’s conventional powers and critical national infrastructure. Such a counter-drone architecture would and must fuse several elements: the detection of incoming drones, the classification of threats, and the ability to rapidly respond to threats that span multiple defense systems. Essentially, it must work in conjunction with land, air, and maritime forces to preserve combat effectiveness, rather than being conceptualized or left to function as a standalone line of defense."

Abstract: Reports of increasing use of light, manned aircraft in Myanmar help shed light on how strategic logics and context are important to understanding the spread of drone warfare. The military government’s turn toward manned technologies shows how the very logic that is driving drone adoption can also lead to the abandonment of the unmanned character as an essential capability of aerial platforms.