Recently, Japan, the US, Australia, and Germany published a joint cybersecurity advisory on WaterPlum, also known as the Contagious Interview campaign, attributed to a DPRK threat actor. From the advisory, one loader uses two parallel infection chains involving OtterCookie and BeaverTail variants.
I recently analyzed a very similar setup where a single loader also launches two separate infection chains, delivering different malware variants(BeaverTail/InvisibleFerret, OtterCookie) that have previously been linked to the same actor.
What stands out to me is that the operators do not seem to care much about redundancy or efficiency in the infection chain. They seem more focused on stealing as many breadcrumbs as possible, even when the two chains collect overlapping data.
A few notable characteristics:
▶️One loader kicks off two separate infection chains.
▶️EtherHiding is used to fetch BeaverTail-style JavaScript from a BSC transaction.
▶️InvisibleFerret capabilities and distribution endpoints have been slightly updated, suggesting that it is still under active development.
▶️Several stealing targets overlap across both infection chains, but the operators do not seem concerned about that redundancy.