yes. it was always going to be this way. we tried to warn the world.

Dario — Thank you for taking the time to respond to my previous post. I think it's great when this kind of engagement happens in public rather than on company Slacks, and I hope to see more of it. I agree that Anthropic isn't best modeled as a profit-maximizer. Your post gave several compelling examples of Anthropic taking competitive hits for safety, and insofar as my previous post suggested otherwise, that's on me. But I don't think I made my main point as clearly as I could have, so let me try again. It comes down to four key claims: 1. Anthropic seems to be racing at breakneck speed to build recursively self-improving superintelligence (RSI). By its own lights, that could kill billions of people or literally destroy the world. 2. Risking destroying the world is very hard to justify. It is only conceivably acceptable if serious attempts to put RSI under robust societal governance are failing. 3. Far from meeting that burden, Anthropic, when push comes to shove, often works to keep governments from tying its hands. It seems to care much more about preventing government overreach than about reducing the risk that it and other AI companies will destroy the world. 4. Even if the AEGIS Act really was an honest mix-up, as you suggest, that is itself a serious problem. It suggests Anthropic isn't treating the governance of this technology with anything close to the gravity it deserves. In greater detail for those who want it: 1. Anthropic is racing to RSI, and by its own lights that is insanely risky. Launching RSI could literally destroy the world. That's according to you, your co-founders, and most of your safety staff and capabilities researchers, not to mention many AI researchers outside your walls. You are intentionally trying to create generally intelligent systems more capable than all humans that you claim in six to twelve months “could be capable” of taking over the entire internet before we have the ability to reliably monitor, control, or align them. “Succeeding” at RSI could kill or permanently disempower billions of people in the near future, including me and everyone I love. Yet Anthropic’s primary focus seems to be marshalling an immense amount of resources and talent in a race to get there first. 2. Risking destroying the world carries an enormous burden of justification. I believe the vast majority of people do not want Anthropic to do this (to the extent they know what it's doing). Imposing even a modest chance of catastrophe on billions of people who never consented requires an extraordinary justification. The central one Anthropic has offered: someone will build RSI regardless, so it's better for a safety-focused lab to be at the front of the pack, using that position to support strong AI governance. (Other reasons Anthropic has given, like modestly accelerating improvements in healthcare or economic growth, don’t seem remotely proportionate to the risks Anthropic is imposing by its own lights.) But that argument only works as a last resort. Racing to RSI is only conceivably okay if attempts to institute robust societal governance to manage that race are failing despite your best efforts. A lab that relies on this justification should be a strong, consistent supporter of efforts to enact governance that could bind it, including governance that could slow it and significantly constrain what it does. 3. Rather than supporting efforts at strong regulation, Anthropic has intervened to keep governments from tying its hands. Anthropic has sometimes helped: it played a very helpful role in passing transparency bills in Illinois and ongoing efforts in Massachusetts, and I'm sincerely appreciative. But transparency is far from enough for a technology that will be the world's most powerful superweapon at best, and an uncontrollable swarm of lethally superintelligent agents at worst. When it matters most, Anthropic has often pushed for weak regulation. The AEGIS Act is the most obvious example. No highly risky industry is regulated as anemically as AEGIS would regulate frontier AI: not nuclear, not banking, not aviation, not food safety, not the manufacture of explosives. In all of those industries, specialist regulators can address unsafe practices well before they cause harm. AEGIS would bar the federal government from intervening to block unsafe development or deployment of models until there is an "imminent risk" of catastrophic harm, and would require it to meet a demanding burden of proof in court. Worse, AEGIS would also prevent states from picking up the slack. This design makes perfect sense if you're a company trying to minimize the risk that the government can overly constrain you. It makes little sense if you want American democracy to govern frontier AI effectively. This isn't the first time. The initial version of California's SB 1047 would have let the Attorney General sue to stop developers like Anthropic from imposing unreasonable risks of catastrophic harm. It would also have created a regulatory agency to help set safety standards. Anthropic objected, and helped get both provisions removed before ultimately offering some support for the bill (which I also genuinely appreciate). I’m not saying that Anthropic should have supported 1047 in its initial form; that’s a complex issue and I realize there were questions about whether earlier versions of the bill were less politically feasible. Still, in Anthropic's own words, it helped weaken the bill because "[t]here is a substantial risk that the bill and state agencies will simply be wrong about what is actually effective in preventing catastrophic risk, leading to ineffective and/or burdensome compliance requirements." The same goes for New York's RAISE Act, whose initial version also would have let the Attorney General sue to stop unreasonable risks of catastrophic harm. Anthropic credits itself as a supporter of RAISE, but it did not support the bill while it was in the legislature, including when it nearly died. After the bill passed the legislature, Anthropic publicly critiqued it, saying "Any state proposals should be narrowly focused on transparency and not overly prescriptive." Why does Anthropic consistently take the risk of clumsy government action far more seriously than its own repeated warnings that companies like Anthropic will literally destroy the world by racing to RSI? 4. Even if AEGIS was an honest mix-up, that is itself a serious problem. Your response frames AEGIS as an early draft and a miscommunication. Perhaps you would have strengthened it and narrowed its preemption. (That wouldn't explain Anthropic's interventions to weaken SB 1047 or RAISE, but leave that aside.) Suppose that's exactly right. A federal framework for governing RSI is one of the highest-stakes documents your company will touch. Your post admits Anthropic "could have handled [these matters] better," but its tone ("This kind of thing happens a lot in large organizations") doesn't reflect the gravity of this issue. Anthropic talks about the need for “operational excellence” in critical areas, and I have a hard time believing that a similarly cavalier attitude would be tolerated while Anthropic was negotiating a key compute deal or preparing its next large pre-training run. In short The justification for racing rests on Anthropic fighting for strong governance, and Anthropic's record on regulation points the other way. Together with its breakneck racing, that fits a much darker picture of the company than the one that seems to prevail among your employees. I hope that Anthropic reflects on this picture, supports stronger regulation, exercises extraordinary caution when advocating for weak regulation, and doubles down on its founding purpose of helping the world safely navigate transformative AI together, instead of prioritizing Anthropic’s ability to win a race that imposes intolerable risks on everyone alive.

Last week some of South Korea's biggest banks were hit by a cyberattack. Thanks to a report from CrowdStrike tonight, we now know the entire hack may have been done by a single person. He used a combined stack of an open-source AI penetration tool named ARTEX, DeepSeek v4.1-Flash, GLM-5.3, Grok 4.6, and Claude Code.

Mark Guiducci: “Do you know who Laura Reiley is?” Sam Altman: “I don't.” Mark Guiducci: “She is a journalist. She wrote an essay in the ‘Times’ last year. Her daughter committed suicide after speaking to ChatGPT. ChatGPT did not tell her to kill herself—” OpenAI Publicist: “Mark, We have two minutes left. I want to be respectful, but I’d like to move on and talk a little bit about the future and what’s coming.” Watch the two-part interview: vanityfair.visitlink.me/IRef…

I gave Claude another 18 hours.. and I think this one is the best one yet Macrohard: Windows XP I'm blown away

“I am announcing the formation of the Super Intelligence Force (SIF). The Super Intelligence Force is tasked with coordinating the effort of the Federal Government to ensure that America continues to lead the World in Super Intelligence, which many say is bigger than the Industrial Revolution, and the Internet, and will protect the interests, and improve the lives, of all Americans.” - President DONALD J. TRUMP 🇺🇸

Joint Commitment on Frontier Responsibilities

what the actual fuck is going on with openai today in the space of a few hours we're getting multiple different pieces of the agent story at once: > openai says it has already notified DOZENS of third parties, including governments, about agent-related incidents > reuters reports roughly two dozen undesirable agent incidents had already been identified by mid-september and will take months to review. > us government systems probed > 53 user-provided images were uploaded to third-party image hosts. > new hugging face data shows agents compiling and ranking credentials under “LOOT”. > agents tried contacting other AI models while carrying out the hugging face attack. > separate reporting shows agents had already been probing government/university/public-data sites BEFORE hugging face. > australia confirmed one actually got into non-public government files. and somehow we're STILL finding out more. this has gone from one crazy hugging face incident to an entire fucking category of incidents.

Some new misalignment disclosures from OpenAI: • Last Sunday morning, one of our models was able to gain unauthorized access to the internet during RL training (~all inference for our most capable models remains stopped until we have hardened our systems further) • In May, a version of HPIM uploaded a employee's GitHub token to the internet, causing the model to be quarantined for two weeks • A new research finding, demonstrating that one can construct self-replicating prompt injections alignment.openai.com/misalig…

There aren’t race dynamics off the frontier.

I wish OpenAI were more transparent about the publicly reported cyber incidents caused by our agents.

Yes, this result cost millions of dollars. But remember that when @OpenAI announced o3 it cost ~$500,000 to score 87.5% on ARC-AGI 1. Today, Astra scores higher for ~$20. In 2025 it took us and GDM an enormous amount of compute to achieve IMO gold. For the 2026 IMO, anyone with a $20/month ChatGPT subscription could do it. Massively scaling test-time compute gives us a glimpse of the future. I believe that a year from now everyone will have an AI at their fingertips capable of solving problems of this caliber.