Donjon is the Security Research team at @Ledger. Follow us to get the the latest news from our research. More info on our blog: ledger-donjon.github.io/

An update from @DonjonLedger regarding Germany 🔽 Following reports from one person in Germany, our team inspected devices from retail and distributor stock across the country, including units from the stores named. None showed any sign of tampering. No loss of funds related to implants has been reported anywhere in Europe. We have not yet been able to examine the devices shown online. We invite their owner to send them to our security team so we can analyze them and share our findings.

Update from Ledger Donjon on the CryptoBilis investigation 🔽 @DonjonLedger is investigating Ledger signers sold by CryptoBilis, a reseller in Southeast Asia, that contained an unauthorized hardware implant. Ledger confirmed this on October 10th for one affected user's signer. All confirmed fund losses tied to the incident disclosed on October 9th involve signers sold through CryptoBilis. We have not verified a drain linked to a signer bought elsewhere. CryptoBilis has confirmed it stopped selling Ledger signers while the investigation continues. Based on the Donjon's analysis of the attack, the implant sits inside the enclosure and reads the data shown on the screen. During setup, the signer displays the 24-word recovery phrase. When the implant detects these screens, its microcontroller decodes the words and transmits them over LTE using a provisioned eSIM. The implant is a separate component. It does not modify the Secure Element or the Ledger operating system, and it does not alter transactions or signatures. The Donjon will analyze the signers it receives and will share more as the investigation continues. We have not confirmed the total number of affected users or the total value lost. Figures circulating online come from third parties and Ledger has not fully verified them. If your funds were drained and you have not contacted us, please do so through Ledger Support so we can include your case. We are also reviewing reports of implants in other signers and locations. We will continue to share information as the investigation progresses. Rest assured the Ledger team is going above and beyond to leave no stone unturned to investigate this situation to the strongest possible outcome. If you bought a Ledger signer from CryptoBilis and have not set it up, do not set it up and contact Ledger Support. If you have set it up, transfer your assets promptly to a new signer with a new recovery phrase. Do not enter or restore any recovery phrase on a signer bought from CryptoBilis. Never enter your recovery phrase into a website, app or form. If you lost funds or hold a tampered signer, contact Ledger Support at support.ledger.com and file a report with local law enforcement. Do not send the signer to anyone before speaking with Ledger Support or local law enforcement. If you lost funds, coordinate with law enforcement before opening the signer. Researchers and others with relevant information can write to security@ledger.com. If you did not buy from CryptoBilis and want to inspect the inside of your signer, the guide is at support.ledger.com/article/4…. Use caution and make sure your recovery phrase is backed up first, because opening a signer can damage it. Ledger will never call you, message you directly, or ask for your 24-word recovery phrase. We will update this post when we verify new information.

72 hour update on reseller CryptoBilis incident 🔽 As the investigation continues, we are working with relevant authorities. The volume of impacted devices is limited. We know this is concerning, especially for those directly affected, and we are reaching out to impacted users. To date, all confirmed cases related to the disclosed draining incident of Oct 9th, 2026, involve devices sold through the Southeast Asia reseller CryptoBilis. Our systems and direct sales channels remain unaffected. We take the CryptoBilis situation seriously and are actively investigating. We encourage impacted users to reach out to Ledger Support through official channels and file complaints with their local law enforcement authorities. As a reminder, CryptoBilis has confirmed having ceased all sales of hardware wallets. We are reminding our authorized resellers and distributors to source products only through authorized channels and never to restock returned products. Also, we strongly advise users not to purchase from unauthorized resellers, where the risk of buying suspicious, counterfeit or modified devices is important as nothing operates under ledger security guidelines. Security isn’t static and this incident underscores why we continuously review and strengthen our distribution and anti-tamper processes. We are continuously improving that work now and events like this strengthen our resolution: reviewing authorized reseller controls, advancing hardware protections, and cooperating with authorities. Thanks to @SEAL_911 for their collaborative support and all their efforts. This is an ongoing threat that doesn’t just impact Ledger, but the whole ecosystem, and we are calling others in the space to work with us on making improvements for users. We believe in jointly working with researchers, other vendors and partners on improving industry chain-of-custody practices and anti-tamper techniques. Raising the bar on physical supply-chain integrity benefits the entire ecosystem. If you have relevant information, contact security@ledger.com. For CryptoBilis buyers: do not initialize unused devices. If already set up, move to a new seed on a device from Ledger. If you have concerns that your device was impacted by the CryptoBilis incident, please contact Ledger Support through the official site: support.Ledger.com. Ledger Support is available 24/7 to answer your questions and concerns. Scammers often try to take advantage of incidents like this. Rely only on official Ledger channels. Ledger will never call you, DM you, or ask for your 24-word recovery phrase.

Situation Update: Ledger can confirm that one of the impacted users’ devices contained an unauthorized hardware implant. Ledger is reaching out to impacted users as part of the ongoing investigation. If you have information regarding the investigation, please reach out to Ledger’s bounty program: bounty@ledger.fr. As a measure of precaution CryptoBilis confirmed it has ceased sales of all hardware wallet inventory until the investigation is concluded. Ledger is in active communication with CryptoBilis on next steps. Ledger is working with the appropriate authorities to bring the bad actors to justice, and thanks @SEAL_911 for their collaborative support on the investigation. We have no indication that Ledger’s security infrastructure, systems or services have been compromised. As a reminder, Ledger recommends users who purchased a Ledger device from this reseller to not initiate set up if they have not yet done so. If you have set up your Ledger device, consider moving assets to a new Ledger signer (with a new seed). Security is a constantly evolving landscape; Ledger is continuously adding security mitigations and is working on further, enhanced anti-tampering solutions. Scammers often try to take advantage of incidents like this. Rely only on official Ledger channels for updates, and remember: Ledger will never ask for your 24-word recovery phrase. For assistance or questions, contact Ledger customer support through our official channels: support.ledger.com

If you were just drained to any of the following addresses, please can you reach out to @SEAL_911 asap. Total loss is >$72M+ and increasing. TK6DWNpNe1w2iJRNFpU8aHdrPTATxvXT6C TBkcUMYC7CkTK99tkTnaStQVBastfrs9d9 TCGE3xp6YGRKXxDZiLfysgJW3f22KfMNsW TSDWtuZ2pARUVz4v3PkL2hi3iXPjowAr5a bc1qjqgwejnp8dc0x2938x9n9954hj97t82unx49dl 0x83aeac166f6832ae3500000a24510a95a052a599 0x033636e45d519bebb7b5c2520ca6ce56fbdb4f7a 0x69c8f401cfc6cd40ac94691d6d7c48e3b7a47841

We regularly communicate about the results we achieve. But sometimes, the journey matters just as much as the result. We recently managed to bypass the RP2350-A4 debug protection using an innovative approach combining two techniques: photon emission imaging and laser fault injection. Here our technical blogpost: donjon.ledger.com/blog/rp235… A big thank you to @Raspberry_Pi for the collaboration and for highlighting this work. 💥

Rainbow still makes unicorn traces. 🌈🦄 Some traces never fade. github.com/Ledger-Donjon/rai…

We’re releasing an open EM side-channel dataset for ML-KEM (Kyber) 🔓 • 200k traces × 3 implementations (ref, pqm4, masked mkm4) • Windowed on the pair-pointwise polynomial multiplication • Per-share traces for 2nd-order analysis • STM32F407 Cortex-M4, NumPy format Lowering the barrier to PQC side-channel research. We’ll be presenting the work at OPTIMIST, a CHES 2026 workshop, come and discuss it with us in Antalya! 📜 Paper: eprint.iacr.org/2026/1851 📅 OPTIMIST: optimist-ose.org/ches26

As I said the other day: reproducing an already-patched bug is not "hacking Ledger." What this thread describes is a vulnerability in an outdated version of the Ethereum app. It was identified through our security process and fixed in Ethereum app 1.22.2, released August 13, before this post. No user was hacked. No exploitation in the wild. Running an exploit against an old version after the fix has shipped is a lab exercise, not a finding. And the takeaway hasn't changed. All software has bugs; the question is what happens next. Our model: bugs get found, by @DonjonLedger and by external researchers, they get fixed on every device in the field, and every fix gets a public bulletin. Update your apps to the latest version, Ethereum app 1.22.3+, via Ledger Wallet, and verify the app version on your device, not just the firmware. They update separately. Stay safe.

Our applied PQC series continues. This time, @k15ab_ and @6c656e69 attack masked Kyber768. Masking defeats first-order SCA. But with a centered cross-product and the right covariance model, a second-order CPA recovers the secret coefficient. donjon.ledger.com/blog/secon…

🤖AI didn't just add a tool to the developer toolbox. It changed the economics of security itself. Attackers can now explore faster, iterate cheaper, and scale offense at machine speed. They won't wait for the perfect model. Neither can defenders. The tempting move is to wait for the next frontier model. But let's be honest, it's just a way to avoid doing the work. 😏 A model is not a security capability. A prompt is not an agent. Asking your IDE "is this secure?" will not build you an offensive security team. This is why the @DonjonLedger built Cerberus. Not a model. A harness around models: iteration loops, memory, tools, backlog, triage, verification, auditability, budgets, and human control. Security has never been one answer. It's a loop. The hard part is the last mile. A hypothesis is not a finding. You have to reproduce it, exploit it, prove the impact, verify the preconditions, produce evidence an engineer can act on, then fix it. AI has to take the team all the way, not stop at a plausible report. Plausibility is dangerous in security. This is already producing real, exploitable vulnerabilities across very different stacks (C, .NET, Scala and more), responsibly disclosed. CVEs, PRs, fixes, real impact. Both of these are true at once: AI floods the channel with noise, and buried in that noise are real attackers who know how to use these systems properly. Security has always been cat and mouse. AI didn't create that reality. It made it visible, and it dropped the price of a cat to almost nothing. The cats are everywhere now.🐈🐈🐈 No fight, no chance. Read more in the latest Donjon's article: donjon.ledger.com/blog/ai-se…

AI is changing the economics of offensive security. More scale. Lower cost. Faster iteration. At Ledger Donjon, we’re building Cerberus: a team of agents that audit, triage, prove, and patch with humans in the loop. No fight, no chance. ✍️ @b0l0k_ donjon.ledger.com/blog/ai-se…

⚡"Breaking Post Quantum Cryptography with AI" A non-profiled deep-learning side-channel attack on an unprotected reference implementation. The convolutionnal neural network just plays the role CPA's correlation used to play. The @DonjonLedger 's PQC journey continues. They pointed their open-source deep-learning SCA tooling at the NIST-standardized ML-KEM reference. No clone device. No profiling phase. No fixed leakage model. Only EM traces, chosen ciphertexts, and a small MLP trained per key hypothesis. The correct key is the one under which the network actually learns. ~400 traces. Unprotected target, no masking, no shuffling. - ML-KEM is mathematically sound and standardized. - A reference implementation running on a real chip, without countermeasures, leaks the secret in minutes. PQC security does not stop at standardization. It starts when implementations meet real-world attackers, with probes, not just headlines. Read the article: donjon.ledger.com/blog/non-p…

Laser fault injection on Tropic01 - read our latest blog post, great collaboration with the @tropicsquare team. donjon.ledger.com/blog/tropi…

We continue our series on applied PQC. This time, a study of side-channel attacks on ML-KEM by @k15ab_ and Alain M. Math is the foundation, but in the real world, attackers have other tricks. ledger.com/blog-risk-side-ch…

Security is an economic game: make attacks too expensive to attempt. AI is breaking that equation. Exploits that took months and seven-figure budgets now take hours with an AI subscription. The old playbook won't cut it. The asymmetry that kept us secure is gone...