Quantum Secure Encrypted Money

QTC is now live on near.com, powered by @near_intents. Swap into QTC from 180+ assets across 30+ chains, including BTC, ETH, SOL, and ZEC. Every swap is confidential by default. Quantum secure encrypted money, now one swap away.
63
95
521
171,147
SegWit took 20 months. Taproot took almost four years. There isn’t enough blockspace to migrate everyone in 90 days.
2
12
1,194
Separate Money and State Separate Money and State Separate Money and State
Separate Money and State Separate Money and State Separate Money and State
1
4
24
1,922
This is a great post. It’s too early to ossify anything in blockchains. I also think Ethereum overstates the benefits of switching from snark-friendly hashes to hash-friendly snarks. It’s newer hashes or newer zk systems, and I don’t think either one is obviously better, especially given all the activity on hashsma.sh I also agree that dysfunctional but secure is not really a thing, because if something is hard to use people generally won’t use it. The blockchain industry as a whole has been held back by the fact that you basically have to be a cybersecurity expert to safely use blockchains. Hashes-only means no key exchange, no public-key encryption, probably no threshold sigs, probably no private-information-retrieval. Let’s be agile and alert, many things are changing rapidly. Don’t get trapped in infighting, you’re not a barn animal.
A few reflections on the lattice vs. hash-only debate that our recent Aerie post sparked: 1. Cryptographic ossification for blockchains was never safe. Until the day we know with certainty that P ≠ NP, that finding short vectors in lattices is intractable, that Keccak effectively behaves like a random oracle in deployed SNARKs, and that every single bug has been eliminated from our codebases, blockchains cannot ossify. That is simply not how safe systems are built. Issues will arise, and the system will have to respond. It’s a double standard to reject lattices because blockchains are hard to upgrade if lattices break, while counting on upgrades if AI breaks your hash function or finds a critical zkVM bug. The best counterargument is that hash-only designs are more agile: if your hash function breaks, just swap out the hash. But we must aspire to a higher level of agility than this. Indeed, as I cover next, if SNARK recursion itself turns out to degrade security, the proposed hash-only blockchain designs would need to be rethought from the ground up. 2. The real security debate is not lattices vs. hashes — it is lattices vs. building everything on SNARK recursion. That’s because “hash-only” is not really hash-only: it rests on hashes plus the soundness of deep SNARK recursion. Ethereum’s roadmap relies on exactly that: hash-based aggregation needs recursion to keep up with a slot’s worth of signatures, and EIP-8288 would send other signature schemes and users’ own proofs through the same recursive pipeline. In contrast, Aerie proves a slot’s worth of signatures on one laptop without any recursion. All deployed post-quantum SNARKs rely on the Random Oracle Methodology (via Fiat–Shamir) to establish their security. This is an idealization we know fails in the real world: we have explicit counterexamples where “SNARKs” coming out of this methodology are totally insecure when instantiated with any concrete hash function. We generally ignore these counterexamples in part because they only arise when proving contrived, self-referential statements about the very hash function used by the SNARK verifier. But proving statements about the verifier’s own hash function is the exact thing you do in SNARK recursion. That’s why the security of recursive SNARKs can’t be established even in the random oracle model. On top of that, the standard security proofs for recursion (in other models) suffer an “extractor runtime” blowup that is exponential in the recursion depth, suggesting that security may degrade as more recursion is applied. Yet Ethereum’s own EIP-8288 enables unlimited-depth recursion, even as it lists soundness of recursive SNARKs as a trust assumption. Proofs in more idealized models avoid the blowup, but they mainly tell us that an attack on SNARK recursion would have to exploit the concrete hash function, which is exactly what the Fiat–Shamir attacks above do. To be clear, we don’t know of any outright attacks on SNARK recursion, and I very much hope it is secure. But some of us who have studied the question have a lingering sense that an attack may be possible in some settings. And if AI is going to supercharge cryptanalysis, there is no reason to expect it to spare Fiat–Shamir for SNARKs, let alone SNARK recursion, both of which have had far less scrutiny than lattices. So, I do not concede that a “recursion everywhere” hash-only approach is clearly more conservative than one built on standard lattice assumptions. 3. “Just wrap everything in a hash-based SNARK” (like EIP-8288) faces challenges. Aggregating signatures and proofs off-chain into a single block-level proof is a powerful design independent of the hash-only vs. lattice debate, and I am not telling people to avoid it. But claiming, as Vitalik Buterin did this week, that users can run whatever cryptography they want locally and wrap it in a client-side leanVM proof glosses over major hurdles. For example, leanVM today is a minimal VM designed almost entirely to prove hash-based signatures and recursion, not general-purpose computation. And binary-field SNARKs like leanVM remain slow at proving the integer multiplications that lattice cryptography does en masse. I am optimistic that many of these zkVM challenges can be met (including via my own work, binary-field Twist and Shout, which are now implemented in Magnetar). But regardless, if lattices can make aggregation simpler and faster, then they should be leveraged. We need to be agile no matter what. 4. For chains whose reason for existence is privacy, I truly struggle to understand the pushback. Public-key encryption (and fast single-server PIR) cannot be built from hashes alone, at least not in any black-box way. If lattices break, it is going to be very, very hard for these chains to provide acceptable levels of privacy and functionality. For a project whose entire reason for existence is privacy, a loss of confidentiality is an existential failure. Next to that, a second signature upgrade (after the first one, from elliptic curves alone to, hopefully, a hybrid lattice scheme) is easy. Summary: We don’t know for sure what is secure and what isn’t. We are all weighing unquantifiable risks against each other, and we do not need to agree on a total order on them. But hash-only solutions face many open engineering challenges, and they are not more “conservative” in the way some have argued. Some of those challenges are entirely prosaic and have nothing to do with bugs or cryptography, like hardware support for custom schemes whose hash function is still undecided. I hope we can overcome those challenges within the appropriate timelines, but they must be acknowledged and portrayed realistically. Overall, cryptographic agility and defense in depth (e.g., hybrid signatures) are the answer, which is why we are building both lattice-Jolt and hash-Jolt. In practice, the positions are less polarized than social media discourse suggests: for example, StarkWare is working to make Falcon verification cheap (falcon.provably.fast/), which is great to see. Here is the (apparently) controversial take I am sticking to: Conditioned on agility, whenever lattices make systems simpler or more functional, we should embrace them rather than default to “hash-only” designs. Lattices are what the rest of the world will depend on, with decades of study and hardening behind them, and at the system level, less functional often means less secure. Where hash-only designs are just as simple and functional, by all means use them.
3
3
17
1,466
Quantus users unaffected "Preparing before certainty. We believe it is important to begin preparing well ahead of any CRQC announcement. Bitcoin consensus changes and ecosystem migrations can take years..."
Ensuring Bitcoin’s future in a post-quantum world requires preparation and collaboration across the industry. We're doing our best to contribute to that work along with many others. New blog post live. (link in follow on post).
4
7
51
2,896
Last week in quantum The Quantum Alliance launched to define quantum readiness Ten contributors from nine organizations, including Quantus CEO @YuviLightman, launched the Quantum Alliance, an open standards body for post-quantum readiness in blockchain. It will publish a public definition of quantum readiness, open test criteria, and reference designs for migration. Starknet opened a vote on researching an exit from Ethereum @Starknet opened a non-binding poll on whether to research becoming an independent post-quantum L1. Starknet targets full quantum resistance by 2027, and its bridge and data availability currently move on Ethereum’s schedule. A Yes vote starts research only. The poll closes October 22. AI designed more efficient quantum circuits @AnthropicAI, working with researchers from Harvard and @QueraComputing, had Claude design circuits for eight quantum computing tasks. Each design beat the best previously published one. One design for elliptic-curve point addition, the core step in quantum attacks on ECDSA, uses 17 times fewer gates than the smallest previous design. It reduces what a quantum algorithm needs to run. Google made a key quantum ingredient far more reliable Quantum computers need special “magic states” to run the full range of algorithms, including the kind that could one day break today’s encryption. They’re hard to make. Earlier estimates said producing them could take up to 95% of a machine’s qubits. In a paper published in Science, Google showed a new method on its Willow chip that cut errors in these states about 40-fold. Google says it still has to work at larger scale. Singapore set quantum-safe deadlines Singapore’s Cyber Security Agency asked critical infrastructure operators to submit migration plans by March 2027 and finish migrating by the end of 2031. Other exposed organizations are encouraged to finish by 2035. A grant for quantum-safe pilots opens November 1. Germany set its own post-quantum timeline Germany’s interior ministry, digital ministry, and federal security agency BSI published a national guideline implementing the EU’s post-quantum roadmap. High-risk systems should be quantum-safe by the end of 2030, with the rest largely migrated by 2035. It also calls for crypto-agility, so cryptography can be swapped quickly as threats change. Governments are setting dates. Researchers are making quantum computers easier to build and their algorithms cheaper to run.
9
10
74
3,527
“Why does the discussion around quantum always center around Satoshi’s coins? Because we can point to them on the ledger.” @apruden08 of @projecteleven on why privacy is a first line of defense against quantum attackers.
4
11
70
4,195
The market cap leaderboard no longer tells you what investors care about. @HHorsley of @Bitwise on why the next era of crypto will reward assets with clear, compelling stories. From Quantum & Privacy Day.
2
8
63
4,762
Quantus users unaffected. 99.9995% logical fidelity. 10× better than last month. Apollo on track for 2029. Every ECDSA public key is watching the clock. Quantus launched with lattice signatures in block one. Nothing to migrate.
Quantinuum has achieved a major industry breakthrough that solves a critical error-correction bottleneck and validates our path to delivering a fault-tolerant quantum computer by 2029. We’ve announced a new world record for quantum error correction, achieving 99.9995% logical fidelity on our Helios commercial quantum computer using our error-correction architecture. Equivalent to just five errors in a million operations, the result is 10× better than our previous record achieved just last month and 100× better than the best published result on any other hardware modality. The study also demonstrated a record 12× reduction in logical errors as code distance increased, a critical step toward scalable fault tolerance. These successive breakthroughs using different codes on the same commercial hardware demonstrate how Quantinuum's flexible error-correction architecture and highly accurate trapped-ion technology work together to enable exponential improvements in accuracy, with performance now within the target range for Apollo, our first universal fault-tolerant quantum computer planned for 2029. Learn more: quantinuum.com/press-release…
8
16
104
7,864
The Quantum Bitcoin era has arrived
12
22
192
8,162
Chris (@YuviLightman), founder of Quantus Network, studied math and computer science, plays piano, and named the project after the Latin word for “how much.” He says he’s often been early to things because he wants to stick his nose into anything novel. @QuantusNetwork launched its mainnet on September 9th, and he says a wave picked up behind the team right after. He thinks the industry’s $3T needs to go post-quantum and calls the engineering part “not that difficult.” On today’s episode: how piano and math connect, why his old teacher’s “repeat until it’s easy” made him a better founder, and why he can tell the gremlins from the whales in Telegram. Timestamps 0:00 - Cold DMs That Actually Work 4:30 - How Piano Teaches You to Be a Founder 6:20 - Timing Is Effort Meets Grace 8:30 - The $3 Trillion Quantum Threat 9:48 - Final Thoughts & Wrap Up
4
7
49
2,841
“Don’t roll your own crypto” is a pretty good rule of thumb it’s error prone and makes you less interoperable with the rest of the ecosystem. On the other hand, you may dodge a bullet… I personally like lattice crypto for the geometry of it. Hash crypto is also elegant in its own way. I think in the age of AI the interoperability question is less important. Just be agile and pick a higher security level than the minimum, so you have some cushion if something breaks.
The case for lattices 👇
5
5
29
2,616
Quantus retweeted
🚨⚡ BIG: Nine crypto firms just formed a Quantum Alliance to set post-quantum standards, warning 6.04M BTC, about 30% of supply, is exposed if quantum computers catch up.
138
129
941
92,460
Proud to be part of the Quantum Alliance. @YuviLightman is one of its founding contributors, helping build standards that make post-quantum readiness verifiable.
🚨HUGE: Nine crypto groups officially launch the Quantum Alliance as over 6 MILLION Bitcoin sit EXPOSED. Quantus, Keystone, Hacken and six others say about 6.04 MILLION $BTC, roughly 30% of supply, is "quantum-exposed at rest." The alliance will set shared standards to test which networks and wallets are truly quantum-ready. No quantum computer powerful enough to crack them exists yet.
7
19
153
8,809
Can humanity break the cycle of debasement? @yuvilightman on global currencies, inflation, Bitcoin, and why Quantus is the last money.
9
14
130
9,141
Quantum Bitcoin, now on @MeteorWallet
Quantum-safe assets deserve quantum-safe custody on NEAR $QTC by @QuantusNetwork is secured by NIST ML-DSA signatures. Meteor now supports ML-DSA keys on NEAR, with a one-transaction upgrade and no change of address. QTC Sprint • Swap a minimum of $100 in $QTC on Meteor • Reply with your transaction link 10 eligible participants will share 2 $QTC rewards
11
24
152
7,534
google just proved a core piece of the $btc attack math on a real chip. $qtc has NOTHING to migrate > tl;dr btc: 1.7m+ coins with the pubkey in plain sight. qtc: 0, dilithium is its only signature google in 3 lines, then qtc vs the quantum alliance checklist below: google, short: - oct 15, in science: magic state cultivation works on willow. 40x fewer errors, 99.99% logical fidelity pic 1: sundar's post x.com/sundarpichai/status/21…, paper science.org/doi/10.1126/scie… - google's march paper prices the btc attack at <500k qubits and ~9 min per key, and its magic state math cites this exact trick arxiv.org/abs/2603.28846 - willow is 105 qubits, no wallet dies today. but coinbase said oct 13 btc's migration can take years 9 teams just launched the quantum alliance to define "quantum ready": signatures, keys, consensus, zk, p2p qtc vs those 5, straight from its docs: - signatures: ml-dsa-87, nist level 5, no ecdsa fallback, lib audited by neodyme - p2p: ml-kem-768 handshakes, ml-dsa peer ids - consensus: pow on poseidon2 hashes, nothing for shor to break - zk: plonky2 starks, no trusted setup - keys: hd wallet ending in a dilithium keypair pic 2: the no-ecdsa line docs.quantus.com/deep-dives/… and the sig size table docs.quantus.com/deep-dives/… the cost of being pq: one ml-dsa-87 sig is 4,627 bytes vs 64 for a btc schnorr sig, ~72x fatter sent raw, a 3.75mb 12s block fits ~510 transfers = ~43 tps qtc's wormhole folds them into zk proofs: ~430 tps with current aggregation, ceiling ~2,800 pic 3: wormhole performance table docs.quantus.com/deep-dives/… and if a key ever leaks: opt-in high-security accounts force a delay on every outgoing transfer and a guardian can cancel it. on btc a confirmed theft is final respect to @QuantusNetwork for shipping pq on p2p and zk too, not just signatures, on a mainnet live since sep 9 honest minus: quantus is a founding member of that alliance, so judge the docs, not the vibes. and the exit to near runs on an mpc bridge with no named signature scheme, hashcloak audit still pending. flagged it oct 14 next: the alliance writes the standard, f2pool already mines it, testnet miner airdrop in the app runs till dec 1 meanwhile on btc: 1.7m+ coins, ~9% of supply, sit in p2pk scripts with the pubkey public from the first block they landed in pic 4: google's own paper arxiv.org/html/2603.28846v2#… also on @QuantusNetwork have a 1st launchpad @qlyphsxyz which is endorsed by the $qtc team and supported by them. you should take a closer look at it👀 so when you see "quantum cracks bitcoin by 2029" all over the tl, now you know: the chip is years out, the migration is the real clock. qtc started on the other side of it now you know more about $qtc than 99% of ct
$QTC went live on near.com today with only 1.27% of its supply actually circulating > tl;dr 98.7% is unmined or vesting, and the big insider cliff is 338 days out 267k qtc circulating x $100 = ~$26.7m. not the $2.1b fdv math, receipts, how to buy and the one wallet to watch coingecko still shows mc as $0 (coingecko.com/en/coins/quant…), so heres the live chain read from qtcscan.com/supply - 5.72m of 21m qtc issued - 5.46m of that locked in the vesting pallet - ~54k mined since sep 9 genesis > 46 schedules hold 5.42m qtc and release nothing before sep 9 2027. every one is listed here: qtcscan.com/vesting the split is in the whitepaper (quantus.com/whitepaper): 23% team + investors, 4% company, 1y cliff then 36mo linear until today the only market was a cex the team never endorsed, ~$1.4k of +2% depth. their oct 1 warning about it: x.com/QuantusNetwork/status/… > today @near_intents opened qtc to 180+ assets on 30+ chains: x.com/QuantusNetwork/status/… the near pool opened at ~$20 (24h low $19.98). its ~$101 now, 1,781 buys vs 164 sells, $13m liquidity: geckoterminal.com/near/pools… how to buy, official route only: - go to near.com, sign up with a wallet or passkey, no email no kyc - swap into qtc from usdc, btc, eth, sol, zec or 180+ other assets - swaps route through the @rhea_finance pool via near intents solvers - withdraw natively to your own quantus wallet (quantus.com/wallet) if you want self custody - real ca on near is qtc.omft.near, any other "qtc" ca is a copy props to @QuantusNetwork: vesting fully onchain and no dev tax, block reward is just unmined supply / 50m (docs.quantus.com/deep-dives/…) the risk: - miners print ~2k qtc/day (~$200k) - the team pegs mining cost at $45-80/coin (quantus.com/blog/weekly-upda…) - sep 2027 adds ~4.9k/day for 3 years > so when you see "one wallet holds 73% of the float", now you know: its the treasury's 210k, the 1% set aside for initial liquidity. it moved oct 5, and nearblocks now shows 185k qtc bridged to near: nearblocks.io/token/qtc.omft… treasury account, check the outflows yourself: qtcscan.com/account/?address… now you know more about $QTC than 99% of ct. nfa dyor
1
10
37
2,478
The future of quantum-secure blockchains is already here. Listen in to @JoeMattia on @therollupco
EXCLUSIVE: A Quantum Secure Chain Built From Day One Just Launched On NEAR Intents And It Wants To Be The Benchmark @JoeMattia @QuantusNetwork @andyyy @robbieklages Timestamps: 00:00 Intro 00:33 Justin Drake Says Enter Bunker Mode 01:29 Quantum Has Been 20 Years Away Forever 02:07 Balaji Invested Early In Quantus 03:43 Built Quantum Secure From Day One 04:09 Community Voting With Their Dollars Now
5
14
64
5,850