Director of @SoutheastAsiaDC & @AsiaMTI; Author of On Dangerous Ground: amazon.com/gp/aw/d/B09YRYLLR…
Washington, DC
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The latest version of @a_natalegawa and my (now) annual report on perceptions of US and Chinese influence in SEA finds that the US still leads in overall support/trust, but that edge is shrinking. csis.org/analysis/us-and-chi…
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It wasn't just "Japan Week" in DC. Glad to see President Marcos again after the historic Philippines-US-Japan trilateral sunmit.
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All claim lines are continually updated to reflect changes in domestic legislation, delimitation agreements, and continental shelf claims. No claims are depicted from the Paracels. More details are available in the methodology section beneath the map:
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Oof. A succinct encapsulation of the regional feelings I've heard about the Quad's IPMDA so far from @MarSec_Bradford and Ralf Emmers.
rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication…
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Fascinating detail I didn't know about the service of the BRP Sierra Madre/USS Harnett County in Vietnam. It served a similar purpose almost 60 years ago in the Mekong Delta to the one it serves today at 2nd Thomas/Ayungin Shoal warontherocks.com/2024/03/re…
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Wherever books are available: On Dangerous Ground: America's Century in the South China Sea a.co/d/hcop4gT
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Honored and flattered that Gen. Centino, Presidential Advisor for Maritime Affairs and former AFP Chief of Staff, turned up at our event at University of Philippines with a copy of my book!
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Our first deep dive @AsiaMTI into the numbers, composition, and tactics of CN & PH vessels engaged in the regular standoffs around 2nd Thomas Shoal. Rising tensions predate Marcos, but # of CN vessels, esp. militia, exploded in 2023. amti.csis.org/tracking-tensi…
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Karen forced me to choose!
It's official: @GregPoling's favorite child is @SoutheastAsiaDC (sorry @AsiaMTI)! For more program tea and Greg and @elinanoor's thoughts on SEA in 2023, listen to the latest Southeast Asia Radio episode at: csis.org/podcasts/southeast-…
Thanks @JaphetQuitzon for having me back!
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If only @duolingo would launch the English to Tagalog course, I could stop practicing in reverse!
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Global Times making my point for me with today's editorial cartoon. How can China possibly deescalate or negotiate in good faith with Philippines if this is the way it sees Philippine concerns?
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It's not illegal from the perspective of intl law because the EEZ boundary in the ECS is not yet delimited and the area is legally disputed. Japan provisionally uses the median line; China claims a full 200nm.
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OK, I need this for my collection of niche SEA policy-themed t-shirts (yes, that's a real thing). france24.com/en/live-news/20…
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We have only one available for Thailand and consider it a medium confidence finding. It's a large enough sample and weighted by age, gender and education but the methodology is still a bit opaque. I'd say we're confident in the direction but not the size of the pro-US tilt.
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What do publics and elites in SEA really think about China and the US? @a_natalegawa and I have built a polling tracker to better answer.
Top-line: the US still has a significant edge in popularity/soft power despite China's economic advantages. csis.org/analysis/assessing-…
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As of July 2023, @AsiaMTI has identified 24 governments that have publicly called for the South China Sea arbitration to be respected, 19 that have issued generally positive statements noting the verdict, and 8 that have publicly rejected it. amti.csis.org/arbitration-su…
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The Philippines has installed 10 buoys that are likely tracking AIS, including from China's militia ships, in the Spratlys this year. Latest from @AsiaMTI amti.csis.org/buoy-battle-in…
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With India endorsing the 2016 SCS award late last month, 11 countries are publicly supporting the ruling and 8 opposed. 32 have had nice things to say about it but stopped short of explicit endorsement. amti.csis.org/arbitration-su…
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Singapore DM Ng highlights US retreat from leadership on trade and globalization in favor of "nativist" econ policy. Acknowledges IPEF as a way to keep US engaged, but that line feels like a fig leaf.
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Cambodia DPM Tea Banh raises Ream Naval Base in his remarks. Insists it will be developed transparently (it hasn't been) and in accordance with Cambodia's constitution (which bans foreign basing). Implies the deal with China is primarily for Cambodian military modernization.
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Jose Ramos-Horta calls militarization of SCS features illegal and insists on respect for intl law and EEZ rights of claimants.
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Fiji Def Min Tikoduadua says with great power competition, outside engagement in Pacific Islands has never been higher; says Pacific priorities are climate change, IUU fishing, and transnational crime; urges outside parties to consult with, not just talk at Pacific Islands
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Prabowo calls on #SLD23 participants to issue a declaration calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Ukraine. Lays out his own rather detailed plan. I'd describe the vibe in the audience as bemused.
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Def Min Anand of Canada: "We must call a spade a spade." Criticizes China's militarization and coercion and sea, and especially rising unsafe intercepts of Canadian aircraft.
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Sec Galvez going harder than I expected. Says the 2016 arbitral award is binding and indisputable; PH will defend its sovereignty against all challenges; decries coercion and grey zone challenges; welcomes intl partners who have voiced support on the SCS.
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Kicking off today's main event, Austin starts by recognizing the presence of Ukraine's Defense Minister here at #SLD23
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Rushing to post my view of PM Albanese's SLD speech before @nktpnd does. I've probably failed.
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The emerging storyline that this is unusual is wrong. China's state-owned survey ship have been operating like this around VN, Malaysian & Indonesian drilling for years, and are usually surrounded by militia and CCG deployments of this size. For example:
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In "Clean Energy and Decarbonization in Southeast Asia" @Dani_Fallin @k_xlee and I examine the feasibility of carbon neutrality (CN) plans across SEA and how the US can help close the gap. Hint: it won't be with solar and wind alone. csis.org/analysis/clean-ener…
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Today's G7 Foreign Ministers' Communique is the first time to my knowledge that France and Italy have publicly called on China to comply with the 2016 SCS arbitration. That makes it 10 countries supporting, 33 "positively acknowledging," and 8 opposed amti.csis.org/arbitration-su…
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The unsung economic success story of the region. GDP & GDP per capita have nearly doubled since 2010 when structural reforms began under Aquino. Expected to enter upper middle income status next year.
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I promise I tried to ignore maritime security during my family vacation. But Reykjavik has a whole street commemorating the Cod Wars.
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In @AsiaMTI's latest the team examines recent CCG pressure on Vietnamese drilling at Nam Con Son and Malaysian operations at Kasawari in the SCS. amti.csis.org/perilous-prosp…
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And of course, China is developing new deep water gas wells. 3 are technically on the continental shelf claimed by Vietnam. These might be less problematic if China weren't trying to deny its neighbors the very same rights it is exercising with impunity.
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Malaysia continues to develop the major gas field at Kasawari despite CCG harassment in 2021. And it has recently found oil or gas at three other blocks despite previous Chinese attempts to block exploratory drilling.
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Indonesia is moving ahead with the Tuna block, which was harassed for months by the CCG in 2021. It will be connected to Vietnam's pipelines at Nam Con Son. And Indonesia is offering up a new block this year, also inside the 9 dash line.
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THREAD > Every claimant except Philippines is moving forward with oil and gas projects in disputed waters of the South China Sea. Vietnam, despite years of CCG harassment, is seeing new work from Zarubezhneft, Harbour, Idemitsu, and potentially Exxon. amti.csis.org/almost-everyon…
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Excited to give my first Malaysian book talk for On Dangerous Ground. Thanks @Sumathy44024911 and MIMA for hosting!
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Excited to give my first Malaysian book talk for On Dangerous Ground. Thanks @Sumathy44024911 and MIMA for hosting!
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Thanks @maracepeda for humoring my pseudo analysis of the BRP Teresa Magbanua as a microcosm of the new US-PH-Japan alliance network. straitstimes.com/asia/se-asi…
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#8: Institutionalize shared understanding of obligations under a more equal US-PH alliance, which could include Taiwan contingencies.
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Sixth, more trilateral & quadrilateral dialogues and military engagements. The hopefully upcoming conclusion of JP-PH ACSA and RAA agreements would help a lot (look to President Marcos's trip to Japan later this month).
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Fourth, on working together to bolster Philippine military capabilities, including at EDCA sites. A timely recommendation given the expected announcement on additional sites from Secretaries Austin and Galvez in a few hours. 🤞
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THREAD > Last Sept, the @SoutheastAsiaDC team held a trilateral workshop on US-Ph-JP alliance networking at the HQ of our friends @JIIA_eng. Those discussions informed this report by @a_natalegawa @Dani_Fallin and me. Read on for the key recommendations. csis.org/analysis/building-u…
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The CCG continued to patrol all its favorite South China Sea haunts on a near-daily basis in 2022. In fact, days on station rose compared to our last count in 2020 (esp at Vanguard Bank). Our latest from @AsiaMTI amti.csis.org/flooding-the-z…
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As for the SBFV fleet out of Guangdong (the ones you see "swarming" Thitu, Whitsun and other reefs in the Spratlys), our max daily count for vessels in Guangdong militia ports and the Spratlys last year was about 300.
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Our ship count using commercial imagery (below) found 160 militia ships in port at Hainan on the busiest day. That included Wenchang Qinglan and Danzhou Baimajiang, where the Qiong Sansha Yu fleets dock. But it also included Sanya Yazhou, which has its own Qiong Sanya Yu fleet.
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The source for THAT is ONI. But judging by its PLAN/CCG ID Guides, ONI probably only counts the Sansha City militia in the Paracels (these are the ones named Qiong Sansha Yu). Here's the inset from the Dec. 2022 guide. Note the asterisk about other militia boats not included:
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Why the impulse? Because the NIDS report says there are only about 80 militia boats (pg. 67), citing a chart in the Dec. 2020 Tri-Service Strategy report from the USN, USCG & USMC. Here's that chart:
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