Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy and National Security at @AsiaPolicy’s Center for China Analysis. Previous @DeptofWar; @RANDCorporation; @NBRNews; @CSIS.
Washington, D.C.
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Pleased to share my latest @AsiaPolicy report, "The Factors That Matter: A Formula for Understanding China’s Use of Force Calculus Over Taiwan."
The purpose is to put myself in Xi's shoes to understand China’s calculus for whether to use military force to "reunify" Taiwan. It introduces a formula for understanding the macro-level internal and external factors that China and Xi Jinping will likely consider, divided into two categories: internal and external factors. Internal factors are variables within China’s control and deal primarily with Chinese military capabilities, domestic political and economic stability, and leader legacy. External factors include variables largely, but not completely, outside the control of China and China’s leaders—namely, the role of Taiwan and its identity vis-à-vis mainland China, the role of the United States and its allies and partners, and the military capabilities of the Taiwanese military. The intent is not to offer an exhaustive or comprehensive list of all factors that matter, but rather to explore the factors of most consequence to China. The factors identified here are intended to be time and leader-agnostic—meaning they should stand the test of time irrespective of which leader is in charge in China (or the United States and Taiwan, for that matter).
My main takeaway is that a Chinese decision to invade Taiwan would not be driven by a single trigger, but by the interaction of multiple internal and external variables. Internally, Beijing would weigh the PLA’s military readiness, China's domestic stability, and Xi Jinping's political legacy and strategic objectives. Externally, Chinese leaders would assess Taiwan's perceived trajectory toward permanent separation, the broader international environment, the likelihood of U.S. military intervention, the willingness of U.S. allies and partners to respond, and Taiwan's own deterrent capabilities.
The good news is that these factors have not coalesced in such a way to prompt Xi to decide to invade. But 2028 remains a key inflection point, with presidential elections in Taiwan and the United States.
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Pleased to offer some thoughts on China's new military base in Laos in this @politico piece. Thanks, as always, to @PhelimKine for the opportunity to engage!
politico.com/newsletters/nat…
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Here is an English translation of the 12 “understandings.”:
I. "One Country, Two Systems" is the crystallization of the political wisdom of over 5,000 years of Chinese civilization; it represents a major innovation and pioneering achievement in global political civilization, as well as a significant contribution to the global resolution of political disputes and the realization of "unity in diversity" in governance. It possesses great vitality and must be upheld and refined over the long term.
2. Adhere to the central government's overarching policy toward Taiwan of "peaceful reunification and One Country, Two Systems." Regardless of whether reunification across the Taiwan Strait is achieved peacefully or through non-peaceful means in the future, we must firmly implement "One Country, Two Systems." It is the optimal choice for a governance system, best aligns with the political and social realities of Taiwan, best serves the overall interests of the Chinese nation, and best accords with the global trends of peace and development.
3. Any institutional arrangements for the "One Country, Two Systems" model for Taiwan must be premised on safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and development interests. Under this premise, the central government exercises comprehensive jurisdiction and, in accordance with the law, grants a high degree of autonomy to the Taiwan Special Administrative Region. The "One Country" in the "One Country, Two Systems" model for Taiwan refers to the People's Republic of China; this is fully established under both international and constitutional law, leaving no room or conditions for further debate regarding the name of "One China."
4. Properly manage the three key relationships within the "One Country, Two Systems" model for Taiwan: the relationship between "One Country" and "Two Systems," the relationship between the central government and the Taiwan Special Administrative Region, and the relationship between the central government's comprehensive jurisdiction and the Taiwan Special Administrative Region's high degree of autonomy. All power held by Taiwan derives from authorization by the central government. In this context, drawing upon the practical experience and lessons of "One Country, Two Systems" in Hong Kong, reasonable adjustments and arrangements regarding the power of final adjudication in Taiwan are required. Final adjudication authority concerning matters such as national sovereignty, security, defense, and foreign affairs shall be vested in the Central Authorities, while final adjudication authority over general civil, criminal, and commercial matters shall be vested in the Taiwan Special Administrative Region (SAR).
5. The practice of "One Country, Two Systems" in Hong Kong and Macao offers significant reference value for the "Two Systems" model for Taiwan; this experience must be thoroughly studied and summarized. It is recommended that laws, regulations, and operational mechanisms for safeguarding national security in the Taiwan SAR be incorporated into a dedicated chapter of the "Basic Law of the Taiwan SAR," rather than enacting a separate "Law on Safeguarding National Security in the Taiwan SAR." The future governance system of the Taiwan SAR should combine "executive-led governance" with "governance in accordance with the law." Crucially, the principle of "patriots governing Taiwan" must be firmly implemented, supported by an effective system of guarantees and operational mechanisms. (1/2)
SCMP reports that several of China's main Taiwan-focused research institutes have completed or nearly completed a first set of plans for governing Taiwan after unification, with scholars saying peaceful unification could grant Taiwan the widest autonomy available under 'one country, two systems', graded according to how unification occurs. It is the first systematic output to surface since Xi Jinping called in 2019 for concrete proposals.
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6. Strengthen research on security and social stability during the transition period following non-peaceful reunification. Should reunification be achieved through non-peaceful means, the implementation of the "One Country, Two Systems" model for Taiwan would entail a significant "transition period." During this period—lasting three to five years—a form of "quasi-military administration" could be implemented. Criminal liability would be pursued against ringleaders of "radical Taiwan independence" factions, individuals who persecuted proponents of reunification, and key "Taiwan independence" figures who colluded with external forces or betrayed national interests. The primary task would be to ensure a secure and stable transition for Taiwan, achieving the goals of moving "from war to governance" and subsequently "from governance to prosperity."
7. Maintain the stationing of Central Authority troops in the Taiwan SAR. Following reunification, and drawing on the "One Country, Two Systems" practices in Hong Kong and Macao, the Central Authorities shall station troops in the Taiwan SAR to safeguard the security of both Taiwan and the nation. Concurrently, the armed forces of the Taiwan region shall be disbanded, and their weaponry and equipment confiscated and transferred to the Central Authorities. Taiwan compatriots may voluntarily join the Chinese People's Liberation Army in accordance with the law.
8. Adjust the administrative divisions of the Taiwan SAR and reorganize its political party and electoral systems. Abolish the existing special municipality system in Taiwan, replacing it with a structure of counties and cities or reorganizing the region into six major zones. Retain Taiwan's political party system, provided that party charters and platforms comply with the requirements of the "Basic Law of the Taiwan Special Administrative Region" and do not engage in activities that compromise national security, unification, or national development. Reorganize the local electoral system; direct elections may be adopted for the Chief Executive, the Legislative Yuan, and heads of counties, cities, or administrative zones. Thoroughly "de-nationalize" and "de-centralize" all legal documents and official instruments, thereby completing the transition of the Special Administrative Region (SAR) into a truly local administrative entity.
9. Thoroughly reform Taiwan's textbooks and promote patriotism and civic education. Focus on eliminating "anti-communist" and "colonial" elements from the curriculum while implementing education centered on patriotism and the rule of law.
10. Following unification, the Taiwan SAR may engage in non-governmental exchanges—such as trade and cultural activities—with the international community. Foreign or international economic and commercial organizations may establish offices in Taiwan to conduct various forms of economic and civil interaction.
11. Define a new strategic positioning for the Taiwan SAR post-unification: a defensive bulwark for national security in the east; a key node in the Zhejiang-Fujian-Taiwan Greater Bay Area; an Asia-Pacific hub for economic operations; a base for high-tech industries; and a center for the mutual learning of civilizations and cultural exchange.
12. Given the increasingly urgent situation regarding national unification, the "Basic Law of the Taiwan Special Administrative Region" must be drafted as soon as possible. The central authorities will solicit and incorporate opinions and suggestions from various sectors across the Taiwan Strait—particularly from Taiwan compatriots—before the National People's Congress makes the final decision on the plan, advances the legislation to completion, and promulgates it for implementation at an appropriate time.
(Source: bj.crntt.com/crn-webapp/touc…)
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Just in case there is any confusion about my stance: this is a complete waste of time by PRC academics keen to show "thought-leadership" on a post-Taiwan annexation political environment. Sure to please Xi and Beijing. Has zero influence in Taipei.
If anything, it lays bare the complete failure by Beijing to propose a political framework for "unification" beyond 1C2S that is at all palpable to the people of Taiwan.
SCMP reports that several of China's main Taiwan-focused research institutes have completed or nearly completed a first set of plans for governing Taiwan after unification, with scholars saying peaceful unification could grant Taiwan the widest autonomy available under 'one country, two systems', graded according to how unification occurs. It is the first systematic output to surface since Xi Jinping called in 2019 for concrete proposals.
scmp.com/news/china/politics…
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Important commentary by my @AsiaPolicy colleague @GranoSimona in @Diplomat_APAC, titled "What Would Europe Do in a Taiwan Crisis?"
Simona asks a question diplomats and policy-makers in Europe have long-contemplated: how would Europe respond to a military crisis over Taiwan?
That question should be discussed more openly in Brussels and EU capitals with the general public.
thediplomat.com/2026/10/what…
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Natsec folks on Twitter piling criticism on @jekavanagh should be reminded that Charles Glaser made a similar argument about abandoning Taiwan in 2015 in @IntSecHarvard.
Except the difference is Glaser did not prescribe retreating to the 2IC, saying:
"In return, China would peacefully resolve its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas, and officially accept the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia."
I don't agree with either arguments, but let's not forget about the academic history.
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The US and China are reportedly discussing reciprocal nuclear site visits. This is what we can expect the PLARF to show the U.S. #nothingtoseehere
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Lyle Morris retweeted
New: The Trump administration has discussed reciprocal nuclear site visits with China and plans to continue pushing for that possibility during in-person meetings in the coming months, according to sources familiar with the matter. W/ @davis_winkie cnn.com/2026/10/06/politics/…
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SCMP reports that several of China's main Taiwan-focused research institutes have completed or nearly completed a first set of plans for governing Taiwan after unification, with scholars saying peaceful unification could grant Taiwan the widest autonomy available under 'one country, two systems', graded according to how unification occurs. It is the first systematic output to surface since Xi Jinping called in 2019 for concrete proposals.
scmp.com/news/china/politics…
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Pleased to share the @asiapolicy video from a webinar I hosted a few weeks ago, featuring @sungminchohi and Emma Chanlett-Avery, on “New Strategic Priorities: How China is Responding to Russia–North Korea Military Cooperation.”
Great discussion on an important topic.
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Link to video here: asiasociety.org/video/new-st…
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Lyle Morris retweeted
Join us tomorrow in New York for what should be a great discussion @AsiaSocietyNY!
Tuesday at 9 AM, assess the future of the Quad and the regional dynamics of a changing Indo-Pacific with @kenj0126, @ThitinanP, @ZackCooper, @faamer, and Emma Chanlett-Avery. asiasociety.org/policy-insti…
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Lyle Morris retweeted
Thanks again to @KennedyCSIS & @LyleJMorris for the many economic & political perspectives on the Indo-Pacific @AustriainUSA last week.
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Lyle Morris retweeted
Scoop: Unusual Rest Breaks for Xi Jinping Sucked Hours Out of Summit With Trump wsj.com/world/china/unusual-… via @WSJ
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Chinese users of WeChat finding out first hand the consequences of sharing confidential or sensitive pictures of PLA equipment and research. 5 years in jail in some cases. The MSS/CAC is cracking down on unauthorized dissemination of military issues on social media, especially on WeChat, ever since the CAC Feb. 2025 "Measures for Managing the Dissemination of Military Information on the Internet."
I drew attention to this new measure in my @WarOnTheRocks article on PLA sources: warontherocks.com/the-blind-…
This week, China's Ministry of State Security WeChat account (保密观) published a post highlighting 3 cases involving 3 ordinary Chinese people who were punished for leaking military security information:
1. Zhang was working as a temporary employee at a defense-industry enterprise when he took out his phone to snap pictures of new military equipment that was still under development, and then shared them in his family's WeChat group to show off. Those family members then shared them with their friend groups. Zhang received a five-year prison term for leaking state secrets.
2. Lu was a military enthusiast (there are many of them online) who collected & reposted military-related articles. After being approached by a foreigner claiming to be a journalist, he shared materials he had collected with them - including "confidential internal documents" - in exchange for money. The court found him guilty of leaking information, and he was held criminally responsible (they don't detail the punishment he received).
3. Tang liked to take photos of aircraft. In order to do so, he went to a high floor in a residential complex next to an aircraft testing facility, and from this "excellent vantage point"- as he called it - he spent two days photographing several types of military aircraft, including some not yet disclosed, and posted them on social media. Even though he deleted the pics within 10 minutes, the pictures had already been reposted/shared. It was determined that he leaked "military secrets," but it isn't disclosed what legal consequences he faced.
> This all sounds scary, and that's the whole point. The message propagated by China's Ministry of State Security is basically that anyone can end up in trouble for photographing/sharing sensitive military information.
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Great discussion on takeaways from the Trump-Xi summit. Thanks for hosting us, @AustriainUSA!
Thank you to the @AustriainUSA & @SchneebauerP for hosting @LyleJMorris & myself for wide-ranging discussion on the Trump-Xi summit & implications for the rest of the world.
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My CCA colleague @zhubochubo published an important commentary in @ChannelNewsAsia on the South China Sea, entitled "Return of tensions in the South China Sea was a matter of time."
He finds that the return of regular clashes was "all but inevitable," in part due to the tenuous nature of the July 2024 agreement between China and the Philippines that allowed relative calm to prevail around Second Thomas Shoal. Chubb adds that "The Philippines cannot put off such work indefinitely if it wants to maintain its position at the shoal. Given the rapid decay of the Sierra Madre in the salty maritime environment, doing so could in effect entail abandoning a reef that lies squarely within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)."
channelnewsasia.com/commenta…
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Pleased to contribute to this @AsiaPolicy analysis of the implications of Xi's state visit, including contributions from @neilthomas123, @wstv_lizzi, Scott Shaw, @AGraylin @GranoSimona, and Joan Kaufman. Thanks to @susanjakes and @ChinaFile for partnering on this piece!
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I shared my thoughts on the question "Did 'Constructive Strategic Stability' Acquire Operational Content?" My answer, after reading the readouts, was surprisingly that it did.
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